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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States has long acted as though it is safe from crimes against humanity occurring
within its borders. Confident in its democratic traditions, constitutional norms, and commitment
to the rule of law, it has treated mass atrocities as a danger that arises elsewhere, under authoritarian
regimes or in war-torn states. Indeed, the United States considers itself a world leader in opposing
crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes, regularly condemning these atrocities when
committed by foreign governments and non-state actors.
But in fact, there is a real and growing risk of crimes against humanity within the United
States, as illustrated by several recent paradigmatic events:
White supremacist and extremist violence: White supremacist and other extremist groups have
escalated their hate speech, threats, and public displays of force from a deadly rally in
Charlottesville in 2017 to an insurrectionist attack on the U.S. Capitol in 2021, in which the
attackers carried Confederate flags, assaulted and killed police officers, and planned to murder
the Vice President and Members of Congress;
Family separation policy: U.S. Customs and Border Patrol officers took thousands of
immigrant children and babies from their parents at the southern border of the United States
in 2018, without tracking their family identities or locations, leaving hundreds of these
children still separated from their families today;
Sexual assaults against detainees: There have been thousands of allegations of sexual assaults
by U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) officers against immigrants in custody
and detention that have gone uninvestigated by DHS; and
Racist police brutality: Systemic police brutality against Black Americans has persisted in
spite of massive, nationwide, public protests, leaving Black Americans more than twice as
likely as White Americans to be killed by police, regardless of the surrounding circumstances
or any other relevant factors.
Furthermore, these developments are not momentary aberrations. Rather, they are the result of
intensifying structural and contextual risk factors that are embedded in U.S. society and
government institutions, like systemic racism, insufficient oversight in government agencies, and
political movements that feed on nationalism and xenophobia. In addition, while the United States
has a robust domestic legal system with ample constitutional protections and a complex
administrative state with a high capacity for self-regulation, these existing protections have not
controlled this escalating risk.
Although the risk of crimes against humanity is substantial, the United States does not have a
federal law prohibiting crimes against humanity, nor any other protective mechanisms directly
aimed at preventing crimes against humanity within its borders. In principle, a federal law could
provide a comprehensive legal framework for protecting against crimes against humanity within
the United States. Such a law might address gaps in existing criminal and constitutional law and
2
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provide a backstop against misuse of political authority. But the long history of treating mass
atrocities as an international rather than a domestic issue and the well-known U.S. resistance to
domesticating international law have made it difficult to garner support for a federal crimes against
humanity law; a past, failed attempt to pass crimes against humanity legislation produced a
problematic bill that deviated in crucial ways from international law. Once instigated, crimes
against humanity are difficult to interrupt and impossible to fully redress. Accordingly, it is vital
to establish systemic legal and institutional safeguards in advance, while the risk of crimes against
humanity is foreseeable but not inevitable.
This Article engages with these issues at the intersection of international and domestic law. It
first applies international law to define crimes against humanity and assess the risk of crimes
against humanity occurring within the United States. It then turns to domestic law to evaluate the
potential for a federal law or other federal measures to protect against crimes against humanity,
including the political obstacles, the likelihood that any future legislation will depart significantly
from international law, and the implications for effectiveness. 1
This Article contributes to the legal scholarship in these areas in several ways. It is the first to
systematically and comprehensively assess the risk of crimes against humanity occurring within
the United States. It uses the United Nations Framework of Analysis for Assessing Atrocity Crimes
(“U.N. Framework”) to identify and appraise overarching factors affecting the level of risk in the
United States today, as well as evaluating the set of representative events mentioned above. This
Article is also the first to examine the role that a federal law could play in preventing crimes against
humanity within the United States. In principle, such a law could be transformative, providing for
culpability for government actors who are currently shielded from liability, offering an additional
bulwark against violence by powerful non-state actors, and presenting a basis for comprehensive
safeguards throughout government agencies with the authority to detain and use force. In reality,
crimes against humanity legislation would face significant political resistance and might deviate
from international legal norms in ways that would render it less effective, or even
counterproductive. Finally, this Article contributes to the understanding of several evolving
concepts in international criminal law, such as the scope of the policy element of crimes against
humanity.
Part II begins with an overview of the purpose and definition of crimes against humanity
under international law. The Article then evaluates the risk of crimes against humanity in the
United States in Part III, first assessing several representative events under the international law
definition of crimes against humanity, and then applying the U.N. Framework to evaluate the
overarching structural and contextual factors contributing to a risk of crimes against humanity.
Part IV assesses the potential for a federal law on crimes against humanity. It describes what a
federal crimes against humanity law comporting with international standards could accomplish;
1

This article focuses on federal law and institutions, not on state and local laws and institutions. Thus, while it
discusses systemic brutality against Black Americans by state and local police departments as an important example
of a possible crime against humanity, it will not address state and local laws and policies; rather, it will only consider
the potential impact of federal law and policy. The involved state and local institutions are too numerous and various
to be addressed in a single article along with other examples.
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explores the reasons that the United States has not adopted such a law, including its international
orientation toward mass atrocities and its exceptionalism in its relationship to international law;
and assesses a previous attempt to pass crimes against humanity legislation and its limitations.
Finally, Part V explores several mitigation strategies, focusing on the U.S. military’s approach to
preventing war crimes as a possible model, as well as considering non-legislative tools that could
institutionalize prevention mechanisms within the federal bureaucracy.
II. CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
A. Purpose and Role
Seventy-five years after the establishment of the Nuremberg Tribunal, there is now what
William Schabas has, somewhat aspirationally, called a “relatively seamless body of ‘atrocity law’
covering all serious violations of human rights.” 2 This includes three atrocity crimes that have
come to be universally recognized as non-derogable peremptory or jus cogens norms: the
prohibitions on genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. 3 The prohibition on crimes
against humanity is the atrocity crime that is potentially applicable in contexts like that of the
United States, as it prohibits atrocities committed in peacetime as well as during war and does not
require genocidal intent. 4
Within atrocity law, the particular role of crimes against humanity is to protect civilian
populations against atrocities committed by the state or powerful non-state actors, even during
times of peace, and even if those actions are shielded by the state’s domestic law and policy:
A crime against humanity is an international crime that can be committed by an
individual whether or not the national law of the territory in which the act was committed
has criminalized the conduct. The crime is directed against a civilian population and
hence has a certain scale or systematic nature that generally extends beyond isolated
incidents of violence or crimes committed for purely private purposes. The crime
concerns the most heinous acts of violence and persecution known to humankind. The
2

William A. Schabas, Semantics or Substance? David Scheffer’s Welcome Proposal to Strengthen Accountability for
Atrocities, 2 GENOCIDE PREVENTION: AN INT’L J. 34 (2007).
3
International Law Commission, Seventy-first session, Geneva, 29 April–7 June and 8 July–9 August 2019, Fourth
report on peremptory norms of general international law (jus cogens) by Dire Tladi, Special Rapporteur, A/CN.4/727,
at 26 & 38–42 (Jan. 31, 2019); see also In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, MDL No. 381, No. 04-CV400, at 214 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity, in CRIMES OF WAR: WHAT THE PUBLIC
SHOULD KNOW 107, 107–08 (Roy Gutman & David Rieff eds., 1999).
4
Draft Articles on Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Humanity, with commentaries, at 2 (2019) (“Draft
Articles”); Bassiouni, supra note 3, at 107–08. In the case of genocide, the perpetrator must have the intent to destroy
a racial, religious or other designated group, and, in the case of war crimes, the harm must occur in the context of an
armed conflict. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Paris, 9 December 1948),
United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 78, No. 1021, p. 277 (“Genocide Convention”); Geneva Convention relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Geneva, 12 August 1949), United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 75, No.
973, p. 287; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Geneva, 8 June 1977), United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1125, No. 17512,
p. 3 (collectively, “Geneva Conventions”).
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crime may be connected with an armed conflict, but that need not be the case; crimes
against humanity can occur in peacetime. The crime can be committed within the territory
of a single State or can be committed across borders. Finally, the crime can be committed
by a government, but can also be committed by other actors, including rebel movements,
militias, or terrorist organizations.5
In particular, while many of the modern prosecutions for crimes against humanity have
concerned failing states in times of conflict, crimes against humanity address acts that can all too
readily be committed by a highly functional, bureaucratically efficient, and politically ruthless
government:
The leitmotif binding together all the legal features [of crimes against humanity] is that
of politics gone horribly wrong. The crimes are committed by organized political groups
against other groups, typically within the same society. Rivalry and antagonism is normal
among groups in virtually every society, but crimes against humanity occur when normal
rivalry and antagonism “go supernova” and explode into violence and extraordinary
persecution. 6
Thus, examples of crimes against humanity include not only attacks on civilians during the
conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Sierra Leone, the genocide in Rwanda, and the paradigmatic
example of the Nazi state. They also include acts carried out systematically by state officials
against their own citizens outside of a war context: for example, the torture and murder of political
opponents by Alfredo Astiz and Jorge Eduardo Acosta, who were part of the junta governing
Argentina in the 1970s; the arrest, torture, rape and murder of political opponents ordered by
Hissène Habré, the former President of Chad; and the torture, enslavement, murder, and other
abuse of its own citizens by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. 7
The individual acts required for crimes against humanity are generally recognized as crimes
or severe human rights abuses themselves, so the function of crimes against humanity as a separate
international offense is not to criminalize those individual acts. Rather, the prohibition on crimes
against humanity serves several additional roles. First, it identifies for international condemnation,
prevention, and punishment, certain mass crimes that are so horrific that they constitute offenses
against all of humanity that are of concern to the entire international community. 8
Another core function of crimes against humanity is to safeguard against a state targeting or
failing to protect its own citizens. Because it concerns severe human rights violations that are
widespread or systematic or both, crimes against humanity identify the kinds of crimes that are
5

Sean D. Murphy, The International Law Commission’s Proposal for a Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of Crimes Against Humanity, 50 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 249, 252 (2018) (emphasis in original).
6
David Luban, A Theory of Crimes Against Humanity, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 85, 108–09 (2004).
7
United Nations Human Rights Council, Commission of Inquiry report on human rights in the Democratic People’s
Republic
of
Korea,
A/HRC/25/63,
at
14–15
(Feb. 7,
2014),
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/CoIDPRK/Pages/ReportoftheCommissionofInquiryDPRK.aspx.
8
Luban, supra note 6, at 86.
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rarely committed independently by individual actors in contradiction of state policies or in the
absence of organizational support. Rather, widespread or systematic atrocities often happen under
the authority of a state that is directing the acts itself or has delegated power to agents who use that
power to commit the attacks. In addition, these crimes also frequently occur under the direction of
a powerful militia or other non-state actor that the concerned state is unable to control. In such
circumstances, ordinary domestic law and policy are unlikely to effectively address these abuses
and indeed may be weaponized against victims.
In keeping with this function, crimes against humanity have special legal characteristics that
are distinct from ordinary crimes. Because these crimes are so severe, because state officials are
often involved, and because the involvement or incapacity of the state often prevents their
immediate prosecution within the concerned state, certain legal defenses and immunities do not
apply in this context. For example, crimes against humanity are not subject to a statute of
limitations, and neither legality under domestic law, superior orders, nor the defendant’s official
position are substantive defenses. 9 In addition, there is a developing norm against any form of
official immunity for crimes against humanity or other atrocity crimes. 10
Most importantly for this Article, the purpose of prohibiting crimes against humanity is not
merely to enable prosecutions. Rather, the purpose is more immediately to trigger an obligation
for states to take preventative measures to prevent crimes against humanity from occurring at all.
In considering what kinds of measures this might entail, Sean Murphy has identified six forms of
protective action that are consistently included in multilateral treaties concerning major crimes or
human rights violations and that were thus incorporated in the International Law Commission’s
Draft Articles for the Prevention and Prosecution of Crimes Against Humanity (discussed
below). 11 Of course, states are obligated under such treaties not to commit the relevant human
rights violations or crimes themselves; they are also required to take action to prevent these harms
from occurring, and to punish them when they do occur. 12 Particularly relevant for the issues
addressed in this paper is the requirement that states “take legislative or other measures to prevent
atrocities,” 13 including adopting domestic laws, policies, and implementation mechanisms aimed
at prevention.
All in all, the prohibition on crimes against humanity addresses situations in which the state
is unlikely, once events have been set in motion, to be able to effectively protect its citizens. The
state itself is often culpable; domestic law and policy have often been coopted in service of the
atrocities; non-state actors may be beyond the functional control of the state. It also addresses
9

Draft Articles, supra note 4, arts. 6(4), 6(5) & 6(6) and associated commentaries, at 58–62.
Margaret M. deGuzman, How Serious Are International Crimes? The Gravity Problem in International Criminal
Law, 51 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 18, 57–58 (2012); Dapo Akande & Sangeeta Shah, “Immunities of State Officials,
International Crimes, and Foreign Domestic Courts,” 21 EUROPEAN J. INT’L L. 815 (2010).
11
In addition to the four requirements listed in the text, states also have protective obligations of non-refoulement and
cooperation with intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and other states. Sean D. Murphy,
Codifying the Obligations of States Relating to the Prevention of Atrocities, 52 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 27, 35–51
(2020).
12
Id. at 35–39 & 51–52.
13
Id. at 39.
10
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situations in which the crimes involved are so horrific as to be universally condemned. Thus, it is
vitally important for the state to establish safeguards against such atrocities—and especially
safeguards against itself—before atrocities occur.
B. Definition
Unlike the other two atrocity crimes, genocide and war crimes, the international crime of
crimes against humanity does not yet have its own treaty defining its elements. 14 Instead, the
elements of crimes against humanity have evolved over time in customary international law since
the crime was first prosecuted at the Nuremberg Tribunal. Since 1993, the requirements of crimes
against humanity have been further developed in the statutes and jurisprudence of the modern
international and hybrid criminal tribunals, including the International Criminal Court (“ICC”).
Others have carefully traced this historical development, which I will not reiterate in detail here. 15
While the prohibition on crimes against humanity is a peremptory norm, as Leila Sadat has
observed, “the absence of a consistent definition and uniform interpretation of crimes against
humanity has made it difficult to establish the theory underlying such crimes and to prosecute them
in particular cases.” 16 For exactly this reason, the International Law Commission has recently
developed Draft Articles on Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Humanity17 (“Draft
Articles”), which could form the basis for a convention on crimes against humanity. A primary
purpose of developing the Draft Articles was to produce for crimes against humanity a definitive
set of elements and related rules, as genocide and war crimes have, so as to enable international
consensus on and consistent application of this norm to an extent that it is not possible by relying
entirely on customary international law. 18 The Draft Articles draw heavily on the Rome Statute of
the ICC 19 (“Rome Statute”), which has been ratified by more than 120 states, 20 as well as on
customary international law and the statutes and jurisprudence of other international tribunals; in
particular, the Draft Articles adopt the Rome Statute’s definition of the elements of crimes against
humanity in all relevant respects. 21
This Article will refer primarily to the definition of crimes against humanity in the Draft
Articles (and accordingly also the Rome Statute), with discussion in the text and footnotes of
aspects that are not identical with articulations in other instruments or might diverge with
14

Genocide Convention, supra note 4; Geneva Conventions, supra note 4.
Draft Articles, supra note 4, at 9–10; Christopher Roberts, On the Definition of Crimes Against Humanity, 20 U.
PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 1 (2017).
16
Leila Nadya Sadat, Crimes Against Humanity in the Modern Age, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 334, 334 (2013).
17
Draft Articles, supra note 4.
18
Draft Articles, supra note 4, at 2; see also Michael Wood, The General Assembly and the International Law
Commission: What Happens to the Commission’s Work and Why?, in INTERNATIONAL LAW BETWEEN UNIVERSALISM
AND FRAGMENTATION: FESTSCHRIFT IN HONOUR OF GERHARD HAFNER 373, 384 (Isabelle Buffard et al. eds., 2008).
19
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, entered into force July 1, 2002 (“Rome
Statute”).
20
The States Parties to the Rome Statute, International Criminal Court, https://asp.icccpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/Pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20rome%20statute.aspx.
21
Draft Articles, supra note 4.
15
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customary international law. The Draft Articles represent broad international political and legal
consensus among a large number of states and legal experts that take account of and contribute to
customary international law but are not co-extensive with it; they do not constitute a codification
of customary international law. 22 As discussed in detail in Part IV, the United States has not yet
adopted this or any other definition of crimes against humanity; I note in the footnotes whether the
United States has provided any commentary on the relevant provisions.
In the Draft Articles as in customary international law, crimes against humanity consist of two
major components: an underlying act or acts, and several contextual or chapeau elements. The
Draft Articles list ten underlying acts, all of which constitute severe human rights violations on
their own, as well as “other inhumane acts of a similar character”:
(a) murder; (b) extermination; (c) enslavement; (d) deportation or forcible transfer of
population; (e) imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation
of fundamental rules of international law; (f) torture; (g) rape, sexual slavery, enforced
prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual
violence of comparable gravity; (h) persecution against any identifiable group or
collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender, or other
grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in
connection with any act referred to in this paragraph; (i) enforced disappearance of
persons; (j) the crime of apartheid; (k) other inhumane acts of a similar character
intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical
health. 23
Of particular importance for analysis of the risks recently arising in the United States are the
prohibitions on acts of murder, rape, enforced disappearance of persons, deportation, and torture,
as discussed below. 24

22
While the Draft Articles are still under consideration, the definition comes from the Rome Statute, which has the
agreement of 120 states, and the articles were developed by the respected scholars and practitioners who comprise the
International Law Commission. Id. at 3; see also Y. Tan, The Rome Statute as Evidence of Customary International
Law, Doctoral Thesis, Leiden Law School (Apr. 9, 2019), https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/handle/1887/71143;
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 24, § 102(2) (1987).
23
Draft Articles, supra note 4, art. 2, pp. 7–9; Rome Statute, supra note 1919, art. 7. The United States argued in its
comments on the Draft Articles that the definition of deportation should not be interpreted to interfere with its
sovereign right to control its borders and limit immigration. It has also urged clarification of the scope of “other
inhumane acts.” Comments from the United States on the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on “Crimes
Against Humanity” as Adopted by the Commission in 2017 on First Reading, 71st session of the International Law
Commission, at 6 (2019), https://legal.un.org/ilc/guide/7_7.shtml (“U.S. Comments”).
24
Other characterizations of these underlying acts have included some but not all of these crimes; for example among
the statutes of four of the ad hoc hybrid criminal courts, all included murder, deportation, extermination, rape, and
torture; three included imprisonment and persecution; two included slavery; and apartheid, enforced disappearance of
persons and enforced sterilization were each included in only one. Statute of the Special Criminal Court, art. 2,
http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/scsl-statute.pdf (“SCSL Statute”); Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary
Chambers, with inclusion of amendments as promulgated on 27 October 2004 (NS/RKM/1004/006), art. 5,
https://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/legal-documents/KR_Law_as_amended_27_Oct_2004_Eng.pdf (“ECCC
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The listed acts constitute a crime against humanity when committed in the context of the
chapeau or contextual elements, that is, “when committed as part of a widespread or systematic
attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.” 25 Of significance to
the U.S. context is that, according to the Draft Articles, the “attack” need not be a military attack,
but rather, requires “a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of [the listed
underlying] acts . . . against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or
organizational policy to commit such attack.” 26 This definition has the effect of creating several
additional requirements to meet the contextual element of an “attack”: “multiple commissions”
and “a state or organizational policy” that those commissions must be “pursuant to or in
furtherance of.”
This definition of attack is significant for a couple of reasons. First, it includes actions that are
not part of a single violent assault in the colloquial sense of “attack” 27 and thereby encompasses
actions that take place in an orderly, controlled, and gradual manner. It also excludes actions that
take place in the absence of a state or organizational policy, and thereby rejects actions taken by
individuals of their own accord. 28

Law”); Republic of Kosovo, Law No. 05/L-053 on the Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutors Office, art. 13;
Statut des chambres africanes extraordinaires, art. 6, https://www.hrw.org/fr/news/2013/01/30/statut-des-chambresafricaines-extraordinaires# (“EAC Statute”).
25
Draft Articles, supra note 4, art. 2, pp. 7–9; Rome Statute, supra note 19, art. 7. The United States did not provide
any comments on these elements. See U.S. Comments, supra note 23. The International Law Commission’s
commentary on the Draft Articles reviews the prior evolution of these contextual elements. To summarize, the
formulation “widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population” has become well-accepted over time in
international and hybrid courts’ statutes and jurisprudence and in the Commission’s work. Past contestation over the
use of the conjunction “or” rather than “and” has now been consistently resolved in favor of the “or” formulation.
Draft Articles, supra note 4, at 12–15. The jurisprudence of the ICC and the ad hoc international tribunals indicates
that “civilian population” includes everyone except combatants and members of armed groups, militias and military
forces. It encompasses both foreigners and citizens of the concerned state. The entirety of a civilian population need
not be affected; rather, the attack must merely have some collective nature rather than being solely against individuals.
Id. at 15–18. As discussed below, some argue that the policy requirement is not required by customary international
law. Previously, additional contextual requirements were inconsistently included in the statutes of some of the earlier
ad hoc tribunals, for example, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia required that the attack have been committed on a discriminatory basis, while the Special Court
for Sierra Leone and the Extraordinary African Chambers did not impose any additional requirements. Id. at 9–17.
26
Id. art. 2, at 7–9; Rome Statute, supra note 19, art. 7. The United States did not provide any comments on this
definition. U.S. Comments, supra note 23.
27
The first definition of the noun is “the act of attacking with physical force or with unfriendly words: assault,” and
of the verb is “to set upon or work against forcefully.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/attack.
28
While there been some debate about whether this provisions applies to non-state actors, the use of the term
“organization,” ICC jurisprudence, and the application of crimes against humanity to non-state actors in the ad hoc
tribunals, all indicate that it does. Draft Articles, supra note 4, at 21–23; Sadat, supra note 16; but see M. Cherif
Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity: The Case for a Specialized Convention, 9 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV.
575 (2010). In its comments, the United States asserted that non-state actors like ISIS are properly included as
organizations, but that criminal gangs are not. U.S. Comments, supra note 23, at 6–7.
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The questions of what constitutes such a policy and how it can be proven are thus particularly
significant to the scope of crimes against humanity as applied. 29 A narrow definition of such a
policy might require an affirmative, expressly stated plan of action, but the history of atrocities
tells us that this would be unreasonable, as most states are not as forthcoming as Nazi Germany in
recording their planned crimes for posterity. According to the ICC’s Elements of Crimes, the
policy requirement entails that “the State or organization actively promote or encourage such an
attack against a civilian population.” 30 But the Elements then qualify this requirement by affirming
that “a policy may, in exceptional circumstances, be implemented by a deliberate failure to take
action, which is consciously aimed at encouraging such attack.” 31 As further elaborated by ICC
jurisprudence, a policy need not be explicitly stated, but rather, can be implied from patterns of
actions, preparatory activities, and other behaviors. 32 It also need not be formulated entirely in
advance, but rather, can develop over time. 33 Furthermore, a policy need not be established at the
highest level of the state, but can instead be developed at a local or regional level. 34
Thus, while the parameters of the policy requirement are still evolving, both local and national
policies, both explicit and de facto policies, and both advance-planned and evolving policies can
qualify. Furthermore, willful blindness to an attack can constitute a policy, if it is deliberately
meant to encourage the attack. The inclusion of this policy requirement in the definition of “attack”
was introduced for the first time in the Rome Statute and is now carried forward in the Draft
Articles, and it is debated whether it is part of customary international law. 35
III.

RISK

While I am focusing in this paper primarily on current and future risk, any consideration of
the possibility of crimes against humanity occurring within the United States today must begin
with the reality that the federal and state governments have, throughout their history, both
committed and permitted crimes against humanity. Although, as discussed in Part IV, the federal
government’s approach to laws and policies opposing crimes against humanity seems to presume

29

The policy requirement has been the subject of considerable academic debate. See Guénaël Mettraux, The Definition
of Crimes Against Humanity and the Question of a “Policy” Element, in FORGING A CONVENTION FOR CRIMES
AGAINST HUMANITY 142–43 (Leila Nadya Sadat ed., 2011); Darryl Robinson, Defining ‘Crimes Against Humanity’
at the Rome Conference, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 43, 50–51 (1999). The United States did not provide any comments on
this requirement. See U.S. Comments, supra note 23.
30
International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2, at 5 (2000) (“Elements of
Crimes”); see also Sean D. Murphy, Special Rapporteur, International Law Commission, First Report on Crimes
Against Humanity, A/CN.4/680, at 68 (Feb. 17, 2015) (“First Report”).
31
Elements of Crimes, supra note 30, at 5; First Report, supra note 30, at 68.
32
Draft Articles, supra note 4.
33
Id.
34
First Report, supra note 30, at 68.
35
Sadat, supra note 16, at 371; William A. Schabas, State Policy as an Element of International Crimes, 98 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 953 (2008) (“State Policy”); Luban, supra note 6, at 96–97; Guénaël Mettraux, Crimes Against
Humanity in the Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda,
43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 237 (2002).
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that crimes against humanity occur only in other places and are committed only by other
governments, that presumption is unfounded.
By way of highlighting several significant examples, and without attempting to be
comprehensive: There were numerous historical instances of actions amounting to crimes against
humanity against Native Americans, including enslavement, forced removal to reservations,
extermination of civilians, forced abduction of children to boarding schools continuing into the
1970s, and forced sterilizations continuing into the 1970s, among other atrocities. 36 Black
Americans have also notoriously been subjected to atrocities constituting crimes against humanity,
including enslavement, murder, torture, persecution on the basis of race, and a system of legal
segregation enforced by violent action amounting to apartheid, among other atrocities; as discussed
below, widespread police brutality against Black Americans today might also be cognizable as a
crime against humanity. 37 Historically, interrogation methods and detention conditions comprising
torture and possibly also constituting crimes against humanity have been systematically used
against suspected and convicted criminals in U.S. police custody and in prison. 38 Under the
auspices of the War on Terror, the United States has systematically abused known and suspected
terrorists, using methods that constitute torture under international law; those methods were
approved as U.S. policy in a Presidential Memo in 2002. 39 The widespread and systematic nature
of the torture of terrorists, in furtherance of U.S. policy, indicates such torture is also likely a crime
against humanity.
As discussed in Parts III.A and III.B below, there are risk factors prevalent within the United
States now that have given rise to particular paradigmatic events signaling a risk of current and
future crimes against humanity. But while these events and risks are produced by the conditions
of this current moment, they are also inextricably linked to this national history of crimes against
humanity. In particular, many of the historical situations of crimes against humanity within the
36

Rose Weston, Facing the Past, Facing the Future: Applying the Truth Commission Model to the Historic Treatment
of Native Americans in the United States, 18 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1017, 1045–49 (2001). Many of these acts
also constitute genocide. Id.; Ann Piccard, Death by Boarding School: “The Last Acceptable Racism” and the United
States’ Genocide of Native Americans, 49 GONZ. L. REV. 137 (2013).
37
Patricia M. Muhammad, The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade: A Legacy Establishing a Case for International
Reparations, 3 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 147 (2013).
38
John T. Parry, Torture Nation, Torture Law, 97 GEO. L.J. 1001 (2009).
39
Memorandum from President George W. Bush to the Vice President, the Sec’y of State, the Sec’y of Defense, the
Att’y Gen., Chief of Staff to the President, Dir. of Central Intelligence, Asst. to the President for Nat’l Security Affairs,
and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees, Feb. 7, 2002; see
also Jamie Mayerfeld, Playing by Our Own Rules: How U.S. Marginalization of Human Rights Law Led to Torture,
20 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 89, 100–01 (2007); Louise Mallinder, Power, Pragmatism, and Prisoner Abuse: Amnesty and
Accountability in the United States, 14 OR. REV. INT’L L. 307 (2012). This Memo was based on advice from the Office
of Legal Counsel that those methods did not constitute torture under U.S. law and that U.S. obligations under domestic
law did not extend overseas, neither of which are defenses to the international crimes of torture or crimes against
humanity. Memorandum from White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales to President George Bush, Decision Re
Application of the Geneva Conventions on Prisoners of War to the Conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban (Jan. 25,
2002). Prior examples include systematic CIA torture, Mayerfield, supra, at 94–99, as well as numerous historical
examples of torture in military interventions overseas and in Chinese immigrant and Japanese American detention
centers within the United States. Parry, supra note 38.
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United States have been based in racism; likewise, the representative situations discussed below
concern Black Americans, predominantly Hispanic immigrants, and White supremacist groups.
Crimes against humanity have been directed at known and suspected terrorists and criminals, and
there has been considerable public rhetoric characterizing immigrants and Black Americans as
such.
Part A first evaluates whether particular representative events might constitute crimes against
humanity or suggest a risk of crimes against humanity occurring. Part B uses the United Nations
(“U.N.”) Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes to identify the structural and contextual
factors affecting the risk of crimes against humanity in the United States today.
A. Representative Situations
In considering whether these particular events might constitute crimes against humanity, it is
important to note two aspects of this assessment that differ from an evaluation of individual
culpability of the sort that would take place in a prosecution for crimes against humanity. First,
this is only a limited assessment of whether crimes against humanity may have occurred in a
general sense. When looking at an event as a whole without focusing on a particular defendant, it
is impossible to assess some of the key elements of the crime, such as the defendant’s intent and
knowledge, and the relationship between a defendant’s individual acts and a broader course of
conduct or plan. Further, whereas a prosecutor would have access to government documents,
witness testimony, and other sources of information that typically form the evidentiary basis of a
judicial determination of culpability, this evaluation is based only on the information that has been
publicly reported.
Thus, this evaluation is by its nature limited to considering, not whether crimes against
humanity did occur, but whether they might have occurred. In particular, I consider below whether
any of the underlying acts are claimed to have taken place, whether those acts seem to have been
widespread or systematic, whether there are indications of a course of conduct comprising the
multiple commission of those acts, whether the acts were committed against a civilian population,
and whether there may have been a government or organizational policy to commit the course of
conduct. Due to the general nature of this inquiry, I do not consider particular individuals’ actions
nor whether particular actions were undertaken with knowledge of an attack.
While this kind of evaluation is limited, it is nonetheless a type of assessment that is
undertaken all the time, as commissions, courts, and other bodies make preliminary determinations
about whether there is sufficient indication of an atrocity crime to justify further investigation. For
example, the U.N. Commission of Inquiry tasked with assessing whether atrocity crimes might
have occurred in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea described its approach as such:
In accordance with Human Rights Council resolution 22/13, the commission carried out
its inquiry with a view to ensuring full accountability, in particular where these violations
may amount to crimes against humanity. The commission is neither a judicial body nor a
prosecutor. It cannot make final determinations of individual criminal responsibility. It
12
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can, however, determine whether its findings constitute reasonable grounds establishing
that crimes against humanity have been committed so as to merit a criminal investigation
by a competent national or international organ of justice. 40
Second, my ultimate purpose, unlike the Commission’s or a court’s, is not to lay the
groundwork for a prosecution. Rather, I am concerned with whether there is a risk of crimes against
humanity that calls for preventative measures. Thus, in addition to assessing whether crimes
against humanity may have occurred, I also consider whether and how the characteristics of these
situations suggest a risk of crimes against humanity occurring within the United States in the
future, as a step toward a systematic analysis of risk in Part III.B. 41
With this analytic framework in mind, several situations have raised concerns about crimes
against humanity occurring in the United States. Of these, the one most fully demonstrable as a
crime against humanity is the family separations undertaken under the Zero Tolerance Policy,
because there was an explicit government policy to undertake the separations, and because the
government’s own statements and investigations indicate that the officials approving the policy
were well aware of the harm it would cause. Accordingly, I discuss this situation first, and with
the most thorough analysis. These acts illustrate the kind of official government policy that may
well constitute a crime against humanity in a peacetime context, as well as the failure of internal
institutional processes to safeguard against them.
Two other situations, police brutality against Black Americans and alleged sexual assaults
against detained immigrants, illustrate two synergistic types of risk. First, particularly in a highly
legalistic environment like the United States, law and official policy typically prohibit the
underlying acts for crimes against humanity. In this context, a pattern of persistent, frequent,
widespread incidents constituting the underlying acts is a warning signal suggesting the possibility
of willful blindness or an alternative, de facto policy. Second, there are inherent risks associated
with delegating extensive authority to detain and to use force. If oversight and intervention
mechanisms are not robust, there is a likelihood that abuses of this power will develop, and such
abuses may in turn interact synergistically with willful blindness or de facto policies to enable
crimes against humanity.
The last example, the risk from White supremacist and other extremist groups, has not yet
eventuated into widespread or systematic acts of violence that would constitute the underlying
acts, although the January 6, 2021 attack on the U.S. Capitol was a significant step in that direction.
This example illustrates that there is a risk from non-state actors as well as the government, as
extremist groups are increasing their level of organization and their capacity to commit crimes
40

United Nations Human Rights Council, Commission of Inquiry report on human rights in the Democratic People’s
Republic
of
Korea,
A/HRC/25/63,
at
14,
¶ 74
(Feb. 7,
2014),
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/CoIDPRK/Pages/ReportoftheCommissionofInquiryDPRK.aspx.
41
Furthermore, even if none of the discussed acts are found to constitute crimes against humanity, this does not
legitimize them. Rather, regardless of their crimes against humanity status, they are serious human rights violations,
and are deserving of moral and legal condemnation on that basis. Most are also violations of U.S. criminal law and
constitutional law.
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against humanity. It also illustrates some of the preliminary steps to crimes against humanity, such
as hate speech, threats, and incitement of violence against disfavored groups.
1. Official Government Policy: Family Separation
Under the Trump Administration’s Zero Tolerance Policy, DHS officers separated more than
3,000 immigrant children from their parents at or near the southern border of the United States, on
the basis of a universal policy of family separation to enable criminal prosecution of the adults for
illegal entry. 42 In addition to families that had illegally entered the United States, DHS officials
also separated at least 60 families that had legally presented at official ports of entry and requested
asylum. 43 In this process, children of all ages, including infants, were taken from their parents.44
Children were detained separately from their parents for weeks, months, or years, and as of October
2020, more than two years after the policy had officially ended, at least 545 children were still
separated from their parents. 45
DHS did not consistently keep or share records of the adults and children who had been
separated, nor of their family relationships, nor did it ensure that it could track and reunite families,
nor that it could definitively identify babies and young children who could not affirm their own
identities. 46 As a result, many parents were unable to obtain information about their children’s
whereabouts and well-being for extended periods of time. 47 Some parents have never been able to
find out what happened to their children, and some parents were deported without their children. 48
It is still uncertain how many families were separated and over what period of time, and the
government is still not able to account for the identities or locations of some of the children that it
took from their parents. 49

42

Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, Review of the Department of Justice’s Planning and
Implementation of its Zero Tolerance Policy and its Coordination with the Department of Homeland Security and
Health and Human Services, 21-028, at 2 (Jan. 2021) (“DOJ OIG Report”); Department of Homeland Security Office
of the Inspector General, “Special Review—Initial Observations Regarding Family Separation Issues Under the Zero
Tolerance Policy,” OIG-18-84, at 3 (Sept. 18, 2018) (“DHS OIG 2018 Report”).
43
Sixty is the minimum number of separated families; the actual number is uncertain because DHS’s records are
incomplete. Department of Homeland Security Office of the Inspector General, “CPB Separated More AsylumSeeking Families at Ports of Entry than Reported and for Reasons Other than Those Outlined in Public Statements,”
OIV-20-35, at 2 & 11 (May 29, 2020) (“DHS OIG 2020 Report”).
44
Id. at 8.
45
DOJ OIG Report, supra note 42, at 2; Executive Order on the Establishment of Interagency Task Force on the
Reunification of Families (Feb. 2, 2021) (“Reunification EO”).
46
DHS OIG 2018 Report, supra note 42, at 9–10 & 15.
47
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General, Communication and Management
Challenges Impeded HHS’s Response to the Zero-Tolerance Policy, OEI-BL-18-00510, at 25–26 (Mar. 2020) (“HHS
OIG Report”); Physicians for Human Rights, “You Will Never See Your Child Again: The Persistent Psychological
Effects of Family Separation” (Feb. 2020), https://phr.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/PHR-Report-2020-FamilySeparation-Full-Report.pdf.
48
DHS OIG 2018 Report, supra note 42, at 13–14; Reunification EO, supra note 45.
49
Reunification EO, supra note 45; DHS OIG 2018 Report, supra note 42, at 11–12.
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The Zero Tolerance Policy reversed a “long-standing DHS practice” of keeping families
together in civil immigration removal proceedings due to “concerns about separating children from
their family during the pendency of the parent’s prosecution.” 50 The government’s justification for
these actions was that it intended to criminally prosecute adult immigrants who entered the country
without authorization and intended to detain those adults before trial, and children cannot be held
in adult criminal detention with their parents, necessitating their separation from their parents. 51
In June 2018, a federal judge ordered the practice of family separation to be ended and the
children to be returned to their parents, as a probable violation of the U.S. Constitution. 52 In
addition to the federal court’s finding of a probable due process violation, legal scholars have
argued that family separation violates rights under international human rights law, the U.S.
Constitution, and U.S. statutory and tort law. 53
a. Family Separation as a Crime Against Humanity
Considering the policy and its implementation as a whole, family separation may have
constituted a crime against humanity. Under the government’s Zero Tolerance Policy, there was a
widespread, 54 systematic 55 course of conduct of multiple family separations 56 directed against a
civilian population of immigrants at the southern border of the United States. 57
Concerning the underlying acts for crimes against humanity, several physicians’ groups
attested that it constituted torture to forcibly separate children from their parents, deny them
knowledge of each other’s whereabouts and wellbeing, and fail to reunite them. 58 In the Draft
Articles, torture is defined as “the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering, whether
50

DOJ OIG Report, supra note 42, at 6.
DHS OIG 2018 Report, supra note 42, at 3. However, some families who were legally present were also separated.
DHS OIG 2020 Report, supra note 43, at 2.
52
Ms. L. v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 310 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (S.D. Cal. 2018) (order granting plaintiffs’
motion for classwide preliminary injunction).
53
Carrie F. Cordero et al., The Law Against Family Separation, 51 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 430 (2020); Reilly
Frye, Family Separation Under the Trump Administration: Applying an International Criminal Law Framework, 110
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 349, 359–73 (2020); Jonathan Todres & Daniela Villamizar, The Trauma of Trump’s
Family Separation and Child Detention Actions: A Children’s Rights Perspective, 95 WASH. L. REV. 377 (2020); Beth
van Schaack, The Torture of Forcibly Separating Children from Parents, JUST SECURITY (Oct. 18, 2018),
https://www.justsecurity.org/61138/torture-forcibly-separating-children-parents/ (“Torture”); Sonya Starr & Lea
Brilmayer, Family Separation as a Violation of International Law, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 213 (2003) (highlighting
several situations in which family separation might constitute a violation of crimes against humanity).
54
Geographically, separations occurred at multiple locations along and near the southern border of the United States.
Numerically, they involved thousands of people.
55
Separations were also part of the organized, institutional implementation of the Zero Tolerance Policy by DHS. The
Draft Articles require only that the attack be either widespread or systematic, but here, it appears to have been both.
56
Thousands of instances of separations have been identified by the government.
57
The immigrants against whom family separation was directed were a civilian population of immigrants entering the
United States at its southern border. They were neither involved in armed conflict nor members of militias or military
forces.
58
Physicians for Human Rights, supra note 47, at 5; Charles Oberg et al., “Treatment of Migrant Children on the US
Southern Border Is Consistent With Torture,” 147 PEDIATRICS 1 (Jan. 2021).
51
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physical or mental, upon a person in the custody or under the control of the accused; except that
torture shall not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful
sanctions.” 59 Concerning intent, internal DHS, DOJ, and Department of Health and Human
Services (“HHS”) reports and documents indicate that officials were repeatedly warned before and
during the early days of the policy that the planned policy would inflict severe psychological
trauma, and in particular, that the government did not have a mechanism for tracking, providing
information about, and reuniting the children with their families, dramatically heightening the
traumatic effect on parents and children. 60 Statements by high level officials at the time affirm that
family separation and the accompanying mental distress were an intended result of the policy; they
anticipated that this would serve as a deterrent to immigration. 61 Concerning the severity and
nature of the suffering, doctors attested that separated parents and children experienced acute
mental suffering and suffered from PTSD, depression and anxiety, particularly in instances in
which neither parent nor child knew each other’s whereabouts, well-being, or when or whether
they would be reunited. 62 The government would likely argue that this suffering was merely
incidental to lawful sanctions for immigration violations, 63 but the government’s failure to secure
the identities and locations of the children and its failure to promptly reunite families following
criminal prosecution of the adults was wholly unnecessary to its interest in criminally prosecuting
adults; that was gratuitously inflicted suffering. 64
59

Draft Articles, supra note 4, art. 2(2)(e), at 8–9.
DOJ OIG Report, supra note 42, at ii; Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, “DHS Lacked
Technology Needed to Successfully Account for Separated Migrant Families,” at 8, 11–23 (Nov. 25, 2019),
https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2019-11/OIG-20-06-Nov19.pdf (“DHS OIG 2019 Report”); HHS
OIG Report, supra note 47, at 15, 18 & 22; Susan Ferriss, “The Trump administration knew migrant children would
suffer from family separations. The government ramped up the practice anyway.,” TEXAS TRIB. (Dec. 16, 2019),
https://www.texastribune.org/2019/12/16/trump-administration-knew-family-separations-harm-migrant-children/.
61
Frye, supra note 53, at 371–72; Phillip Bump, Here are the administration officials who have said that family
POST
(June 19,
2018),
separation
is
meant
as
a
deterrent,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2018/06/19/here-are-the-administration-officials-who-have-saidthat-family-separation-is-meant-as-a-deterrent/; Beth van Schaack, New Evidence Surfaces that Family Separation
was about Deterrence and Punishment, JUST SECURITY (Nov. 27, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/61621/proofsurfaces-family-separation-deterrence-punishment/.
62
Physicians for Human Rights, supra note 47; Ryan Matlow & Daryn Reicherter, Reducing Protections for
Noncitizen Children—Exacerbating Harm and Trauma, 380 NEW ENG. J. MED. 5 (2019); Matthew G. Gartland et al.,
“Case 20-2020: A 7-Year-Old Girl with Severe Psychological Distress After Family Separation,” 382 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 2557 (2020). In addition to the intentional infliction of the severe mental trauma of separation, the conditions
under which children were held and the administration of psychotropic drugs to separated children in detention may
also meet the definition of torture. Gartland, supra; Physicians for Human Rights, supra note 47; van Schaack, Torture,
supra note 53.
63
However, some of the separated families had entered the country legally, and some were asserting asylum claims,
which they were legally entitled to do. DHS OIG 2020 Report, supra note 43. In addition, DOJ did not have to detain
the adults in order to criminally prosecute them, and doing so reversed longstanding agency policy. DOJ OIG Report,
supra note 42, at 6.
64
Also, under U.S. law, torture encompasses a narrower definition of severe mental suffering. 18 U.S.C. § 2340(1).
The government would likely argue that it should be held to the standard under U.S. law rather than international law;
that, under U.S. law, the purely mental suffering of separation does not represent torture because it was not caused by
infliction or threat of physical suffering; that the degree of suffering experienced by the families was not severe enough
to constitute torture; and that it lacked specific intent to cause that suffering.
60
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In instances in which parents were denied information about their children’s whereabouts for
a period of time or permanently, these separations may also constitute the underlying act of
enforced disappearances. 65 In the Draft Articles, “‘enforced disappearance of persons’ means the
arrest, detention or abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of,
a State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of
freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of
removing them from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.” 66 Here, the children
were detained by DHS, which did not track the children or provide information about their location
or well-being to their parents, in some instances for days, weeks, or months, and in other instances
permanently. The government would argue that this was mere incompetence, rather than refusal,
but as noted above, high level officials had advance knowledge that they would not be able to trace
the children when they implemented the policy, and did not remedy this before proceeding. 67 The
government also did not make any plan for reunifying families before implementing the policy. 68
In so doing, the government had the intention of removing those children from the protection of
their substantive due process rights to family integrity under the Fifth Amendment, as a means of
deterring immigrants from entering the country; it also made it impossible for parents to enforce
that constitutional right in instances in which the children’s identities or locations were unknown. 69
Finally, one distinctive aspect of family separation, in contrast to the other government
examples discussed below, is that there was an official government policy at the highest levels of
the DHS and the Department of Justice (“DOJ”). 70 Furthermore, as discussed above, official
statements at the time and later investigations by the Offices of the Inspector General at DOJ,
DHS, and HHS all indicate that in enacting and implementing the Zero Tolerance Policy, the
agencies knew not only this policy would require separating children from parents, but also that
DHS could not track children’s family identities and reunite them with their parents, and that these
measures would cause trauma to the affected parents and children. 71 While some government
officials have periodically tried to argue that the Zero Tolerance Policy only encompassed criminal
prosecution and that family separation was a mere byproduct, that claim is belied by the numerous
statements by the top officials at all three involved agencies that family separation was intended
as a deterrent to immigrants. 72
b. Significant Characteristics
As discussed in Part II, the prohibition on crimes against humanity is meant to constrain the
power of the government to use its resources and authority against civilians in its jurisdiction, and
65

Physicians for Human Rights, supra note 47.
Draft Articles, supra note 4, art. 2(2)(i), at 9.
67
DHS OIG 2019 report, supra note 60, at 8, 11–23.
68
Id. at 23.
69
The government would likely argue that it did not remove the detained children were under legal protection in HHS
custody, and that any protection or communication failures were merely negligent.
70
DHS OIG 2019 Report, supra note 60, at 1–2.
71
HHS OIG Report, supra note 47, at 15, 18 & 22; DHS OIG 2019 Report, supra note 60; DOJ OIG Report, supra
note 42.
72
Bump, supra note 60; Frye, supra note 53.
66

17

Baylis - White Supremacy, Police Brutality, & Family Separation: Preventing CAH in the US
Forthcoming in 2022 U. Ill. L. Rev.
Draft of May 1, 2021

to counteract its capacity to legalize and institutionalize its own behavior. Family separation
demonstrates the risk of the government deploying an official policy through government agencies
under the auspices of domestic law, in spite of existing domestic legal and institutional safeguards.
With its Zero Tolerance policy, the U.S. government designed and implemented an official, high
level policy that it knew would cause enormous harm to the affected immigrants, notwithstanding
countervailing U.S. constitutional due process requirements and previous DHS policy of
prioritizing immigrant family integrity. This is an indicator that there were not sufficient internal
procedural or institutional safeguards within DOJ and DHS (which created and implemented the
Zero Tolerance policy) and HHS (which took custody of the detained children) to prevent these
constitutional and legal violations from occurring. While some staff reportedly expressed concerns
at the time, that internal dissent did not affect the development or implementation of the policy. 73
This also illustrates both the effectiveness and the limitations of the courts as a safeguard
against such harms. An official and publicly acknowledged policy in violation of the U.S.
Constitution is exactly the kind of government action that the federal courts are well placed to
address, and indeed, a judge promptly ordered the federal government to cease its actions and
return the separated children to their parents. 74 The severity of the harm caused was dramatically
curtailed by this intervention; by issuing this order, the court limited the number of affected
families, ensured that many families would be reunited, and shortened the duration of the mental
suffering of those who had already been separated. 75 However, it also demonstrates that external
intervention by courts after a policy has been implemented does not provide either full protection
or full redress; by the time the judge issued an injunction, many families had already been
separated, and some still have not been reunited.
Finally, another contextual aspect of this policy, as discussed further in Part III.B below, is
the anti-immigrant rhetoric that preceded and accompanied it. In 2016, candidate Trump described
immigrants from Mexico as drug dealers, criminals, and rapists. 76 In 2018, concerning immigrants
from majority-Black countries, former President Trump asked “Why are we having all these
people from shithole countries come here?” 77 In 2018, he repeatedly called the movement of
immigrants to the southern border of the U.S. an “invasion.” 78 Such statements, denigrating and
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HHS OIG Report, supra note 47.
See Ms. L. v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 310 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (S.D. Cal. 2018) (order granting plaintiffs’
motion for classwide preliminary injunction).
75
DHS initially estimated that it would separate 26,000 children from their parents during the first five months of the
policy. DHS OIG 2019 Report, supra note 60, at 17–18.
76
Eugene Scott, Trump’s most insulting—and violent—language is often reserved for immigrants, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2,
2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/10/02/trumps-most-insulting-violent-language-is-oftenreserved-immigrants/.
77
Id.
78
Id.; Brent D. Griffiths, Trump: ‘We cannot allow all of these people to invade our country,’ POLITICO (June 24,
2018), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/06/24/trump-invade-country-immigrants-667191.
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dehumanizing particular groups and equating them with criminals and enemies, characteristically
precede and accompany atrocity crimes. 79
2. Willful Blindness and De Facto Policies
While family separation represents an official government policy at the highest level, there
are other systemic and widespread abuses that have long persisted despite countervailing laws and
policies, such as police brutality against Black Americans and sexual assaults against detained
immigrants. In these situations, government officers have been delegated the power to use force,
and they deploy that power to harm those under their control. These abuses represent the inherent
risk associated with the government delegating such power, and the need for corresponding
oversight to prevent abuse, and particularly to prevent abuse from escalating to a level that
threatens crimes against humanity.
Whether these abuses have risen to the level of crimes against humanity depends on the extent
to which the state is complicit, and not merely remiss. So if police department supervisors have
consistently turned a blind eye to severe physical abuse against Black Americans specifically so
that those abuses can continue unimpeded, or if DHS officials have deliberately ignored patterns
of sexual assault in Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) detention centers and Customs
and Border Patrol (“CBP”) custody so as to deliberately enable those attacks, that could constitute
a policy for purposes of crimes against humanity.
For purposes of focusing on the current and future risk of crimes against humanity occurring,
it is important to remember that even if these sorts of commonplace abuses of power do not
constitute crimes against humanity, they are severe human rights violations. As such, they are a
serious harm in themselves, as well as a red flag that there is a risk of escalation to crimes against
humanity.
a. Police Brutality Against Black Americans
The most notorious and controversial ongoing human rights abuse in the United States today
is systemic brutality against Black Americans by state and local police. 80 Well known cases
include the killings of Michael Brown, Eric Garner, Tamir Rice, Freddie Gray, Philando Castle,
Stephon Clark, Breonna Taylor, and George Floyd. 81 In many of these cases, the victims were
stopped for minor infractions, were unarmed, were complying with officers, or were not given an
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opportunity to comply. 82 In most of these cases, police officers have not been indicted or have
been acquitted. 83 These events have come to public attention through widely circulated video
recordings, sparking public outrage and protests, and culminating in massive nationwide protests
by tens of thousands of people following the killing of George Floyd by Minneapolis police
officers in 2020. 84
In addition to these infamous individual incidents, the aggregate statistics on police killings
of Black Americans are alarming. Between 2015-2020, there were more than 5,000 fatal shootings
by police officers, 85 and the raw data suggests that Black Americans are twice as likely to be shot
by police as White Americans. 86 A recent empirical study found that this pattern continued to
persist after controlling for other relevant factors: “We find that, across several circumstances of
police killings and their levels of objective reasonableness, Black suspects are more than twice as
likely to be killed by police than are suspects from other racial or ethnic groups, including
shootings where there are no obvious reasonable circumstances.” 87 Furthermore, the available data
on racist patterns in policing may understate the problem, because it is typically based on selfreporting in police administrative records. 88
These events and aggregate patterns are occurring in the context of other well-known and
interrelated systemic racist behaviors, such as racial profiling and “racial profiling by proxy,” that
is, White Americans calling the police to report Black Americans engaging in ordinary life
activities, such as waiting for someone at a Starbucks or napping in a college dorm common area. 89
The broader context is, of course, the long, well-known history of racist laws, policies, and abuses
against Black Americans, as mentioned above.
Whether police brutality might constitute a crime against humanity depends primarily on
whether there is a supportive government policy of some kind. Accusations of police brutality are
widespread, 90 there have been multiple commissions against the civilian population of Black
82
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Americans, 91 and the alleged killings and injuries could constitute the underlying acts of murder
and torture. 92 But there is not an official government policy of racist brutality against Black
Americans, and to the contrary, all formal government laws and policies prohibit and criminalize
such actions, and there have been numerous reform efforts aimed at preventing racist policing.93
Thus, as Margaret deGuzman argues:
Whether murders and other police brutality against Black people and other people of color
constitute crimes against humanity therefore depends on whether the crimes are
committed in furtherance of a governmental policy of omissions that aims to encourage
an ongoing attack against members of these populations in the United States. 94
As noted above in Part II, such a policy could be found either on a national level or locally.
Because there is not an overarching government authority setting policy for all departments across
the country, a nationwide policy of omission would need to be found in gaps in the constitutional
standards for use of force that apply nationwide. Here, Paul Butler contends that rather than being
an anomaly, police brutality is the inevitable result of the established constitutional standards: that
“the system is working the way that it is supposed to.” 95 According to Butler, through a series of
cases, the Supreme Court has legitimized sweeping “superpowers” for police to stop, search,
detain, and use force. 96 Police are using that authority disproportionately, and nonetheless legally,
against Black Americans, 97 producing both the troubling statistics discussed above and the
individual criminal and civil cases in which police killings and injuries of Black people have been
found to be legally justified.
Another way of assessing policy in this context is to focus on the policies of particular police
departments. Here, the findings of a DOJ investigation into the Police Department in Ferguson,
Missouri after the police killing of Michael Brown underscore the difference between official rules
and de facto policy for purposes of the policy requirement of crimes against humanity. 98 Like all
police departments, the Ferguson Police Department had rules concerning discrimination, use of
force, and other aspects of engagement with its community. But the DOJ investigation found that,
in reality, Ferguson’s Police Department consistently treated “some residents, especially those who
live in Ferguson’s predominantly African-American neighborhoods, less as constituents to be
91
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protected than as potential offenders and sources of revenue” 99 and therefore aggressively arrested,
ticketed, and fined those residents, all the while using force as convenient to gain compliance. 100
Concerning use of force in particular, DOJ found that the official rules “were routinely ignored” 101
and that “[s]upervisors seem to believe that any level of resistance justifies any level of force.” 102
DOJ also found evidence of both discriminatory impact and racist intent in how these practices
were carried out. 103 These practices were in violation of the U.S. Constitution and of the Ferguson
Police Department’s own rules. Yet they were the de facto local policy in this department, as
consistently understood, enforced, and rewarded by supervisors within the Department and by City
officials. 104
b. Sexual Assaults Against Detained Immigrants
Sexual assault is forbidden by domestic criminal law and by DHS policies, and sexual assaults
against detained immigrants constitute a violation of their constitutional rights. 105 Nevertheless,
for many years there has been a widespread, persistent problem of sexual abuse of immigrants by
DHS officers and contractors, and DHS has regularly failed to investigate complaints of abuse or
take action to enforce policies to prevent it. 106 As with police brutality, the raw numbers of
complaints are disquieting: “between May 2014 and July 2016, [DHS] OIG received at least 1,016
reports of sexual abuse or assault filed by people in immigration detention—averaging to more
than one complaint per day.” 107 Similarly, between March and July 2018, HHS received 859
complaints concerning sexual assault or abuse of unaccompanied (or separated) immigrant
children. 108
Watchdogs have found that thousands of complaints of sexual assaults have gone
uninvestigated by DHS OIG, and “one study found that CBP’s Internal Affairs Office, which is
responsible for investigating complaints of misconduct against CBP officers, failed to take any
disciplinary action in 97 percent of complaints about physical, sexual, and verbal abuse.” 109 An
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internal investigative report by the DHS OIG concluded that agency mechanisms for reporting and
addressing such crimes have not functioned effectively. 110 Finally, reports also indicate failures of
institutional procedures and safeguards that should prevent opportunities for abuse. 111
The immediate context for these patterns is the anti-immigrant rhetoric put forth by former
President Trump, and the development of the family separation policy with its infliction of severe
mental distress to deter immigration, both of which indicate some degree of animus against
immigrants. However, these patterns predate the family separation policy by decades and have
persisted through multiple Presidential administrations.
Concerning whether such sexual assaults might constitute crimes against humanity, these
reports indicate a disturbing and persistent pattern of sexual assault against immigrants in DHS
and HHS custody and detention. The alleged incidents constitute the underlying acts of rape and
sexual violence, 112 complaints of sexual assaults have been widespread 113 and there have been
thousands of alleged commissions directed against the civilian population of immigrants in
custody or detention. 114
Thus, as with police brutality, whether these patterns rise to the level of constituting crimes
against humanity depends primarily on whether they have occurred pursuant to some kind of
government policy, notwithstanding countervailing official law and policy. There is of course no
official, publicized government policy of sexual assault, and to the contrary, all government laws
and policies prohibit and criminalize such actions. However, the extensive and persistent nature of
the assaults, together with the a pattern of failing to implement protective practices and failing to
investigate complaints suggests the possibility of willful blindness at the local or national level.
On the local level, individual sexual assault victims have alleged willful blindness by detention
center supervisors, as do plaintiffs in a recent claim of forced sterilizations in an ICE detention
center. 115 On the national level, unlike with police brutality, there is a federal agency setting
national policy; as noted above, there has been a persistent failure to investigate complaints at the
national DHS OIG level as well.
c. Significant Characteristics
The widespread and persistent nature of these problems indicates the inherent risk associated
with the authority to detain, control, and use force against civilians. That authority creates the
110
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opportunity to commit the underlying acts of crimes against humanity, like murder, torture, or
sexual assault. Settings of complete control and vulnerability enhance both the risks of occurrence
and the likelihood of impunity; it is no coincidence that public awareness of police brutality against
Black Americans has risen with an increase in publicly posting and streaming videos. As discussed
below in Part V, the military has acknowledged this risk in its own context by establishing
extensive safeguards for combatants held in military detention and the associated rules for those
tasked with serving in such detention centers.
More generally, as discussed below in Part III, there is additional risk associated with
expanding such authority without pairing it with adequate oversight. In the policing context, for
example the expansion of policing activity associated with the war on drugs is well known. 116 The
Ferguson Police Department provides an example of a particular office’s expansion of authority
to arrest and use force as a means of enhancing revenue, in the context of a complete failure of
oversight of the use of that authority. In the immigration context, there has been increased use of
detention rather than releasing immigrants, as well as increased arrests of immigrants through
workplace raids and other enforcement actions. 117 Indeed, over time, the exercise of authority in
the immigration context has expanded according to virtually every measure, 118 providing
correspondingly greater opportunities for abuse of authority. 119 But as described above, this
expanding exercise of authority has been paired with a failure of existing internal institutional
safeguards to prevent sexual assaults and other abuses.
These examples also illustrate the types of government complicity that might constitute willful
blindness, de facto policies, and local policies that can enable crimes against humanity to develop.
In particular, while of course it is critically important to have official policies prohibiting racist
behaviors, excessive use of force, and physical and sexual assaults, such policies may in some
instances merely provide cover for an actual practice of turning a blind eye to widespread
atrocities. This is especially likely in a highly legalistic environment like the U.S., where
departments and agencies are cognizant of their legal and constitutional obligations and are not
likely to typically roll out an official policy in violation of their obligations, as they did in the
family separation context.

116

Harris, supra note 89.
Deborah Anthony, The U.S. Border Patrol’s Constitutional Erosion in the “100-Mile Zone,” 124 PENN ST. L. REV.
391, 399–408 (2020); ICE Worksite Enforcement Investigations Already Double Over Last Year, U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (May 14, 2018), https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/ice-worksite-enforcementinvestigations-already-double-over-last-year.
118
Between 1998 and 2016, the number of Border Patrol Agents increased from 4,000 to 21,000. Anthony, supra note
117, at 394. Recently, ICE has been creating internal checkpoints up to 100 miles from the border and deploying
roving patrols that operate even further from the border. Id. at 399–408.
119
CBP has long been criticized and investigated for excessive use of force and physical abuse. Patrick J. McDonnell
& Sebastian Rotella, When Agents Cross Over the Borderline: Law enforcement: Charges of wrongdoing in Border
Patrol have forced even loyalists to call for reforms, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 22, 1993),
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1993-04-22-mn-25801-story.html. Against CBP alone, there were about
2,100 claims of excessive force between 2007–12 and more than 1,200 claims of physical abuse between 2012–15.
Anthony, supra note 117, at 395.
117

24

Baylis - White Supremacy, Police Brutality, & Family Separation: Preventing CAH in the US
Forthcoming in 2022 U. Ill. L. Rev.
Draft of May 1, 2021

They also illuminate the connection between such willful blindness and de facto policies and
the escalation of individual actions to the scale of crimes against humanity. Individual officers
with authority over vulnerable populations may be able to commit some crimes against those
populations without being detected, but they should not be able to do so consistently for long
stretches of time, nor should it be possible for numerous actors to commit such crimes on a
widespread or systematic basis, without eventually being detected. Thus, it is only through the
complicity of the state in turning a blind eye or otherwise permitting such crimes that they should
be able to escalate to the level of constituting crimes against humanity. Accordingly, evidence of
a shocking number of underlying acts committed over a long period of time, while not decisive, is
a red flag concerning potential government complicity.
Finally, the long history and continued prevalence of racism in the United States is another
important context for assessing these risks. Racist rhetoric concerning immigrants was discussed
above. The well-known effects of conscious and unconscious bias; the racial stratification of
economic, political and social power; the cultural association of Black Americans with violence;
and the common use of racist language and rhetoric all contribute to the heightened risk of crimes
against humanity being committed against Black Americans. 120
Of course, even if these acts do not have government complicity and thus do not constitute
crimes against humanity, they are nonetheless severe crimes and human rights abuses. As
discussed further in Part III.B, when such serious harms are occurring, and especially when they
go unpunished, that increases the risk of escalation to crimes against humanity.
3. Non-State Actors: White Supremacist and Extremist Violence
The United States has recently seen a dramatic rise in extremist groups, including White
supremacist organizations and armed militias, such as the Oath Keepers, the Boogaloo Bois, and
the Proud Boys. 121 These groups advocate racist, anti-Semitic, sexist, homophobic, and antigovernment ideologies. 122 Many openly endorse violence against political opponents and members
of disfavored groups and call for revolution or civil war. 123 White supremacist groups have made
public appearances and shows of force, as at the “Unite the Right” rally in Charlottesville, Virginia
in 2017, where hundreds of armed white nationalists marched and a counter-protester was
murdered. 124 Far-right groups have been responsible for most of the terrorist attacks within the
United States for several decades, and this has also escalated: far-right extremist groups committed
90% of violent terrorist attacks within the United States in the first half of 2020 and represent the
120
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greatest danger of future attacks. 125 Finally, there has been a sharp increase in violent hate crimes
and in publicly expressed racist, anti-Semitic, sexist, and homophobic views since 2016. 126
Rather than being tight-knit, hierarchical organizations, many extremist groups are more akin
to loose networks that are connected primarily online. 127 Furthermore, until recently, most attacks,
like the shootings at a Pittsburgh synagogue and a South Carolina church, have been singular
events and have been regarded as “lone wolf” actions by individuals. 128 Overall, attacks by
members of such groups have not been sufficiently widespread, systematic, connected to a course
of conduct of multiple commissions, or driven by an organizational policy, to be considered crimes
against humanity.
But that is changing now. Clusters of people within these extremist networks and militias are
beginning to plan and coordinate more ambitious attacks to carry out the aims of their
organizations. 129 As online platforms have become more sophisticated and popular, group
members have leveraged them to grow their organizations and facilitate effective communication
and planning. 130 Social media platforms have become organizing hubs and spaces for expression
of the group’s aims. 131 These new extremist organizations are an expression of the current era in
which online influencers regularly reach millions of followers, 132 fundraising on crowdfunding
platforms raises more than $17 billion annually in North America, 133 and foreign election
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interference plays out on social media. 134 Online networks are now effective conduits of power,
influence, and joint action for white supremacists and other extremists. 135 As such, these groups
are becoming increasingly organized, and their relatively attenuated nature is no longer a limiting
factor in the kinds of attacks they can organize.
Accordingly, there is an increasing risk of these extremist organizations committing violent
attacks on the scale of crimes against humanity. For example, in 2020, there was an escalating
series of assaults on state capitols and plans to murder state officials by members of the Boogaloo
Bois and other extremist and white supremacist organizations. 136 Many believe that the lack of
effective government response to those preliminary attacks emboldened these groups to escalate
their actions. The attack on the U.S. Capitol building on January 6, 2021 was organized online
among a network of people connected with several extremist organizations and militias, including
the Proud Boys and the Oath Keepers. 137 This attack was systematically organized in advanced, 138
and multiple commissions of murder 139 against the civilian population of politicians 140 were
planned so as to achieve the involved extremist groups’ anti-government and White supremacist
aims, and specifically to prevent Congress from certifying the results of the 2020 Presidential

134

Miles Parks, Social Media Usage Is At An All-Time High. That Could Mean A Nightmare For Democracy, NPR
(May 27, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/05/27/860369744/social-media-usage-is-at-an-all-time-high-that-couldmean-a-nightmare-for-democr.
135
Jonathan Carlson, Dark web chat logs appear to show white supremacists at work, CBS (Jan. 30, 2020),
https://www.cbs46.com/investigations/dark-web-chat-logs-appear-to-show-white-supremacists-atwork/article_91d4bf1e-43af-11ea-9d4f-5f2df67efb9f.html.
136
Kathleen Belew, The plot against Whitmer won’t be the last white supremacist threat, WASH. POST (Oct. 8, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/10/08/white-supremacists-gretchen-whitmer/; Tara C. Mahevedan,
“Armed Protesters Storm Oregon State Capitol, Break Windows, Attack Reporters,” (Dec. 22, 2020),
https://www.complex.com/life/2020/12/armed-protesters-storm-oregon-state-capitol-break-windows-attackreporters.
137
Jaclyn Diaz & Rachel Treisman, Members of Right-Wing Militias, Extremist Groups Are Latest Charged in Capitol
Siege,
NPR
(Jan. 19,
2021),
https://www.npr.org/sections/insurrection-at-thecapitol/2021/01/19/958240531/members-of-right-wing-militias-extremist-groups-are-latest-charged-in-capitol-si;
Sheera Frenkel, Fringe Groups Splinter Online After Facebook and Twitter Bans, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/11/technology/fringe-groups-splinter-online-after-facebook-and-twitterbans.html; Sheera Frenkel, How the Storming of Capitol Hill was Organized on Social Media, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6,
2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/06/us/politics/protesters-storm-capitol-hill-building.html (“Storming”).
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Posts on social media indicate advance planning for logistics and weaponry, as well as real-time coordination
during the attack itself. Frenkel, Storming, supra note 137; Russell Brandom, These are the violent threats that made
Amazon drop Parler, THE VERGE (Jan. 13, 2021), https://www.theverge.com/2021/1/13/22228675/amazon-parlertakedown-violent-threats-moderation-content-free-speech. Concerning whether the attack would also have been
considered widespread, geographically, it was narrowly targeted at the U.S. Capitol, the number of potential victims
would likely have been in the hundreds. Of course, for purposes of the elements of crimes against humanity, it must
be either widespread or systematic, not both.
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Advance posts on social media indicated the intent to kill multiple members of Congress. Brandom, supra note
138. Some insurrectionists came prepared with zip ties and weapons, and a noose was erected on the Capitol grounds.
Jay Reeves et al., Capitol assault a more sinister attack than first appeared, AP NEWS (Jan. 11, 2021),
https://apnews.com/article/14c73ee280c256ab4ec193ac0f49ad54.
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election. 141 Had the insurrectionists succeeded in kidnapping and killing the Vice President,
Senators, and Representatives, as many had come prepared to do, it might have constituted a crime
against humanity. Whether a version of the U.S. Capitol attack that culminated in the murder of
numerous government officials would have been considered a crime against humanity would most
likely hinge on the nature of these extremist groups and their involvement: whether their
predominantly online networks constitute “organizations,” and whether their advocacy of violent
warfare and of the specific plan to attack the Capitol constituted “policies.”
Thus, White supremacists and other extremist groups represent an escalating risk that has not
yet eventuated into crimes against humanity, because they have not yet reached the degree of
organizational structure or of planning and execution of violence that is typically associated with
crimes against humanity. Their actions thus far represent preliminary steps to crimes against
humanity, including increasing shows of public force, threats, acts of violence, and hate speech
against disfavored groups, including minorities and political opponents. In contrast to the other
situations, these actors are not part of the government; rather than representing a risk of abuse or
deliberate misuse of state power, they pose the risk associated with a lack of state control over
powerful non-state actors.
While they are not government actors, they are certainly influenced by government approval
and condemnation. As with several of the other situations, former President Trump made
inflammatory statements that these groups and other observers have understood to constitute
endorsement, including urging the Proud Boys to “stand back and stand by” 142 and describing
some of those engaged in the White supremacist protests in Charlottesville as “very fine
people.” 143 His anti-immigrant statements noted above have also served as apparent support for
these groups’ stances. 144
***
Overall, there is reason to be concerned that crimes against humanity are occurring and could
occur within the United States. The incidents discussed above are widespread and extremely
harmful; they represent the gamut of ways that crimes against humanity can manifest, including
official government policies, possible willful blindness by government actors, and the policies of
non-state organizations like militias. In addition to the incidents themselves, there are actions that
often precede or accompany crimes against humanity, like planning, threats, hate speech, and
public displays of power. Notably, all are in violation of domestic law or the U.S. Constitution or
141
The involved extremist organizations generally advocate violence against political opponents and revolution or
civil war. The particular policy here was to use force to prevent Congress from certifying the election results. Among
other statements to that effect, in the 30 days leading up to January 6, the phrase “Storm the Capitol” was used more
than 100,000 times in this context. Dan Berry, “‘Our President Wants Us Here’: The Mob That Stormed the Capitol,”
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/09/us/capitol-rioters.html.
142
Dean Obeidallah, “Trump’s Proud Boys ‘stand back and stand by’ debate moment was more than a dog whistle,”
NBC (Sept. 30, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/trump-s-proud-boys-stand-back-stand-debatemoment-was-ncna1241570.
143
Id.
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Id.
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both—but nonetheless, thus far domestic law and the Constitution do not seem to have sufficed to
prevent them from occurring.
B. Risk Factors
This Part systematically examines risk factors for crimes against humanity within the United
States, drawing on the examples discussed in Part III.A and on other characteristics of the U.S.
socio-political context. The U.N. has developed a Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes
intended to enable observers to assess the risk of atrocities crimes occurring so as to take
preventative measures. 145 The overarching structure of the Framework indicates the kinds of
circumstances that are important. There are eight “common risk factors,” with accompanying
specific indicators, that are relevant to all atrocity crimes: (1) situations of armed conflict or other
forms of instability; (2) a record of serious violations of international human rights and
humanitarian law; (3) weakness of State structures; (4) motives or incentives; (5) capacity to
commit atrocity crimes; (6) absence of mitigating factors; (7) enabling circumstances or
preparatory action; and (8) triggering factors. 146 There are also two factors that are specific to
crimes against humanity because they relate directly to its chapeau elements: “signs of a
widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population” and “signs of a plan or policy to
attack any civilian population.” 147
1. Strengths
Considering these factors and their indicators, the United States benefits from numerous
structural and contextual strengths that tend to make it resistant to atrocity crimes. It has not
recently suffered from armed conflict within its borders, 148 and it has benefited from relative
political, economic, and social stability for many years, although this has arguably diminished
recently. 149 It has a well-established legal and political system with robust constitutional rights
145

United Nations, Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes: A Tool for Prevention (2014) (“UN Framework”).
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destruction. Barbara Harff, Assessing Risks of Genocide and Politicide, in PEACE AND CONFLICT (Monty G. Marshall
& Ted Robert Gurr eds., 2005).
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UN Framework, supra note 145, at 9 (formatting edited for readability).
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Id. at 9.
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Id. at 10 (Risk Factor (“RF”) 1.1).
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Of course, there is economic, political or social inequality, but as compared to many states, the United States has
been remarkably stable with a consistent political framework uninterrupted by coups or revolutions. Id. at 10 (RF 1.41.11).

29

Baylis - White Supremacy, Police Brutality, & Family Separation: Preventing CAH in the US
Forthcoming in 2022 U. Ill. L. Rev.
Draft of May 1, 2021
protected by an independent judiciary, 150 as well as a culture of vigorous political and civil society
engagement. 151 It has an independent, diverse, and well-resourced news media, and Americans
have access to all modes of developing and sharing information, bolstered by constitutional
protection for free speech. 152 It has longstanding civilian control of its military, and the armed
forces have a culture of respect for the constitution and the rule of law, particularly at the highest
levels. 153 While imperfect, its government institutions are reasonably well-funded and typically
function for their intended governance purposes. 154 Although its international relationships have
become more strained recently, the United States has long benefited from numerous international
and regional political and economic partnerships and from membership and leadership roles in
international and regional institutions.155 What is most notable about these strengths is that they
are all quite longstanding and are deeply embedded in U.S. institutions and society, to the extent
that many are part of the Constitution and of the national identity.
2. Red Flags
However, there are also numerous red flags highlighted by the U.N. factors. First, both severe
human rights abuses and atrocity crimes, past and present, are indicators of a risk of future
atrocities. 156 Thus, regardless of whether they are characterized as crimes against humanity or as
human rights abuses, police brutality against Black Americans, sexual assaults in immigration
detention, and family separation under the Zero Tolerance Policy, are all negative factors. For the
same reasons, the U.S. history of crimes against humanity, torture, and other human rights abuses
against Native Americans, Black Americans, criminals, and terrorists, suggests that there is a risk
of committing future atrocity crimes. Simply put, having committed such acts in the past suggests
that a government may do so again.
Impunity for such atrocities and severe human rights violations is another indicator of risk.
Here, the absence of a comprehensive legal or reconciliation process concerning the legacy of
atrocities against Native Americans and Black Americans (and, for that matter, other minority
groups), and the current failure to effectively address police brutality and sexual assaults in
immigration detention, are of concern as indicators of impunity for, tolerance of, and failure to act
to prevent severe human rights abuses and atrocities. 157 The quick response of the courts to the
family separation policy is a counterexample, and the movement toward swift prosecutions of the
insurrectionists who invaded the Capitol building is another. The failure to effectively address the
sexual assault and police brutality issues is particularly notable because a robust constitutional and
judicial system is one of the United States’ strengths, as noted above. Here, the prompt and
effective judicial response to family separation points to where the fault line may lie in judicial
150
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responses; it is much easier for the judiciary to respond to open violations of the Constitution than
to those cloaked in laws and policies professing compliance with constitutional norms.
The growth and public emergence of extremist groups, White supremacist organizations, and
armed militias is another significant concern. “Growing nationalistic, armed or radical opposition
movements” 158 are an indicator of risk, as are “ideologies based on the supremacy of a certain
identity or on extremist versions of identity.” 159 The known motives of these groups are also
identified risks. Political aims, such as consolidating power, economic interests, such as
safeguarding the economic well-being of an identity group, and other interests, such as eliminating
members of minority groups from an area, can motivate atrocities. 160
The capacity to commit atrocities is another significant factor, as both the government and
extremist groups are well armed and capable of carrying out violent attacks. Concerning extremist
groups, weapons and ammunition are readily available and easy to transport within the United
States, and such groups regularly used guns, explosives, and other weapons in terrorist attacks in
2020. 161 Extremist ideologies have garnered the support of large numbers of people, as thousands
turned out for the January 6 riot at the Capitol, and a QAnon supporter was elected to Congress. 162
In addition, there have been multiple events that constitute the preparatory steps that
frequently take place in advance of atrocities, including the creation and expansion of militias,163
increasing public expression of White supremacist ideologies and anti-Semitism, and relatively
small scale violent attacks. In addition, government actions like securitization of the southern U.S.
border and enforcement and deployment of federal troops and officers to counter protests
constitute the “strengthening of the security apparatus.” 164 It’s also important to note that the fact
that these developments are occurring in concert further heightens the risk of crimes against
humanity: increasing securitization creates a risk of crimes against humanity being committed by
security forces, yet the increase in strength and visibility of militias suggests a need for an increase
in counter-action by government security and law enforcement officers. As such, there is a risk of
these two developments acting synergistically on each other to exponentially increase risk in both
dimensions.
Another category of warning signs relates to potential triggering events. The United States
has recently experienced several of the political and social events that can trigger atrocities,
without sufficient preventative action. Epidemics, 165 elections, 166 and mass protests 167 all fall into
this category. While we may hope that the COVID-19 pandemic will abate, the election cycle is
158
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unceasing, and in the absence of effective action on police brutality, mass protests also seem likely
to resurge.
Finally, as discussed in Part IV below, the United States’ longstanding disinterest in engaging
with international human rights and international criminal law standards concerning its actions, its
insistence on treating crimes against humanity and other atrocities as problems that occur only
overseas, and its lack of an internal legal or institutional structure or early warning system aimed
specifically at crimes against humanity, are all problematic. 168 Each of these represents a missed
opportunity to mitigate risk by engaging with international actors and protective frameworks that
would not be subject to the same internal pressures as the domestic system. The potential utility of
a crimes against humanity legal framework is discussed below in Part IV.
C. Implications
The UN Framework analysis identifies multiple relevant risk factors that intersect and interact
in complex ways. Past and ongoing human rights abuses by the government constitute a risk factor
that is further exacerbated when those abuses are tolerated and met with impunity. Further
aggravating these two intertwined factors is the lack of a legal and institutional framework
designed specifically to prevent and address crimes against humanity, which makes it more likely
that any such abuses will persist and that they will not be effectively redressed. Extremist
ideologies and movements are growing, and their danger is heightened by their easy access to
weapons and by surprisingly substantial public support. Further, the rise of extremism tends to
prompt a trend toward securitization by the government, which in turn poses a risk of government
malfeasance. Finally, preparatory steps like planning, hate speech, small-scale violence, and shows
of force, as well as potentially triggering events like the COVID-19 pandemic, the recent elections,
and numerous mass protests, all tend to interact synergistically to intensify the overall risk.
In addition, the representative examples discussed above indicate that there are risks posed by
both government and non-governmental actors, and that those risks emanate both from express
policies and plans and from situations in which written laws and policies may cover for willful
blindness. Here, the UN Framework highlights two salient dynamics: the expansive authority of
government officers in security roles, 169 operating in a context of insufficient oversight. 170 These
two factors point to a key understanding that has long been recognized in the war crimes context:
it is the granting of authority to use force, detain, and control civilians that enables crimes against
humanity by government officials. 171 Accordingly, such authority should be granted cautiously
and requires robust, effective mechanisms of oversight and prevention that can function as an equal
counterweight to the authority granted. A significant risk of crimes against humanity suggests an
imbalance between authority and oversight, or government complicity, or both.
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The UN Framework and representative examples also indicate areas of strength that can be
leveraged against those risk factors. Of greatest importance for this Article, with its focus on legal
interventions, the United States has a strong legal and judicial system that is relatively effective in
responding to overt and express violations through responsive interventions. Thus, while DHS,
DOJ, and HHS did not prevent family separation, the federal courts did immediately end the
practice and require reunification. While the government did not prevent the extremist assault on
the U.S. Capitol, the Acting U.S. Attorney for D.C. is investigating and bringing charges against
the perpetrators.
This highlights several issues that are important for mitigating the risk of crimes against
humanity through legal mechanisms. First, any crimes against humanity-specific legal framework
should be able to address several kinds of risks: risks emanating from governmental and nongovernmental sources, and from both overt policies and willful blindness. In addition, it should
address the risk of crimes against humanity proactively as well as reactively, so as to address
preparatory steps before they escalate, so as to reduce both tolerance of and impunity for human
rights abuses, and so as to balance authority with oversight. This indicates the need, not only for a
legal framework as such, but also for the implementation of that framework as preventative
processes within government institutions.
IV.

LAW

While the risk of crimes against humanity occurring within the United States as assessed in
Part III seems significant, the United States has no federal law prohibiting, protecting against, or
punishing crimes against humanity. 172 Indeed, the federal government does not even seem to have
recognized that such a risk might exist. Instead, the considerable resources that the United States
has devoted to opposing crimes against humanity have consistently been directed internationally,
at events occurring overseas.
Of course, it is perfectly appropriate and indeed vitally important for the United States to be
concerned with atrocities overseas. There are horrific war crimes, genocides, and crimes against
humanity occurring regularly in many countries and raising serious international criminal law,
human rights, and immigration concerns. 173 This Article is not a critique of these international
measures. Instead, this Article argues that—in addition to these outward-facing mechanisms—the
United States should also concern itself with preventing mass atrocities within its borders as well
as abroad.
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On the state and territorial level, there is only one such law, in Puerto Rico; as of 2019, there had been no
prosecutions under that law. Julian Bava, Prosecuting Extraterritorial Atrocity Crimes Under State Law: An Analysis
of the Puerto Rico Model, 44 VT. L. REV. 327 (2019). California has a law addressing the statute of limitations for tort
claims concerning crimes against humanity, but no law concerning crimes against humanity itself. CAL. CIV PROC.
CODE § 354.8.
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(Margaret M. deGuzman & Diane Marie Amann eds., 2018) (“Repairing”).
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It is also important to emphasize that, while the United States lacks a federal law on crimes
against humanity, it does possess alternative legal mechanisms for preventing such acts. As noted
in Part IV, it is governed by a federal constitution with extensive protections for human rights. It
has federal and state criminal laws that prohibit many of the underlying acts constituting one of
the two components of crimes against humanity. And it benefits from a vigorous judiciary that has
demonstrated itself to be capable of effectively constraining the President and federal
administrative agencies when they overreach these existing domestic safeguards.
Thus, the first and most fundamental implication of recognizing that there is a significant risk
of crimes against humanity within the United States is that its existing constitutional norms,
criminal law, and judicial engagement are not succeeding in consistently preventing the underlying
acts. If they were, there would not be a significant risk of those acts escalating to the point that
they might constitute crimes against humanity.
As such, one important strategy for preventing crimes against humanity is to make existing
domestic laws and institutional policies more effective against the underlying acts. In particular,
the risk of crimes against humanity lends further support to calls for reform in the contexts in
which those risks are arising, including police use of force and immigration detention. 174 It also
suggests that prompt, effective action is warranted to prevent violence by militias and White
supremacist organizations, as well as to respond to and mitigate preliminary steps toward such
violence, such as hate speech and threats. In so doing, it is important to balance the risk of crimes
against humanity associated with increasing the power of security forces, as well as to avoid
adopting strategies that could themselves constitute preliminary steps toward atrocities by the
government. Thus, while reforming national law and policy to better protect against those
underlying acts is not the focus of this Article and so will be discussed only briefly below, such
measures are a crucial response to the risks of crimes against humanity identified above. 175
This Part considers whether and how one particular legal countermeasure—a federal law on
crimes against humanity—might mitigate the risk of crimes against humanity within the United
States. Experts and advocates consistently argue for domestic implementation of the international
prohibitions on crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes as the primary mode of
preventing and punishing such acts. In addition, while the United States lacks a federal law on
crimes against humanity, it does have laws prohibiting genocide and war crimes, so passing a
federal crimes against humanity law is not unimaginable.
On the one hand, criminalizing crimes against humanity under U.S. law would provide
specificity, certainty, and legal enforceability far beyond what is available under customary
international law. A federal law implementing the international standards discussed in Part II
would be a robust framework for comprehensive preventative measures. But to the extent that a
federal crimes against humanity law departs from international law, it would be less useful and
174
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would even risk legitimizing behaviors that would comprise crimes against humanity under the
international standard. Furthermore—and here is the Catch-22 inherent in passing federal
legislation—the U.S. history of human rights legislation and treaty ratification indicates
persuasively that diverging from the international standard in ways that would lend an aura of
legitimacy to questionable government practices is exactly what advocates would need to do in
order to pass such a law. 176
Part IV.A describes the role that a federal crimes against humanity law could ideally play. Part
IV.B assesses the reasons for the current legal gap, focusing in particular on the international
orientation of crimes against humanity initiatives and the influence of American exceptionalism.
Part IV.C assesses a 2009 attempt at passing federal crimes against humanity legislation and what
that legislative process indicates about the likely limits on the scope and effectiveness of a potential
federal law.
A. Role of a Federal Law
A federal crimes against humanity law could provide a comprehensive legal framework for
enforcing the international jus cogens prohibition on crimes against humanity as such,
complementing existing domestic criminal and constitutional law. 177 Without a federal law, there
are only very limited possibilities for enforcement under customary international law within the
United States; non-citizens, for example, can bring civil lawsuits under the Alien Tort Statute.178
Under a federal law, such enforcement could take multiple forms, including preventative measures,
deterrence, expressive condemnation, identifying the set of prohibited acts, engagement with
international institutions and processes, and, of course, prosecutions. 179
Addressing first the issue of prevention 180 that is the focus of this Article, a federal law would
provide a basis for comprehensive preventative measures throughout the federal bureaucracy, and
particularly in those agencies which have the authority to detain and use force against civilians and
which thus present an inherent risk of committing crimes against humanity. As discussed in Part
III, preventing crimes against humanity by federal officials requires tempering officials’ authority
with countervailing oversight. In Part V, I discuss how the military has implemented the federal
law prohibiting war crimes with comprehensive precautionary measures and how this might serve
as a model for implementation of a similar prohibition on crimes against humanity. For now, it is
176
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sufficient to note that norm infiltration throughout the federal bureaucracy would enable systemic,
pragmatic preventative measures that could build on existing review and oversight processes. 181
Concerning non-state actors, a federal law could be the basis for prevention in other forms,
such as monitoring, early warning systems, and other forms of federal response, before planning
and preparation by such groups escalates to the point of action. As discussed below, Congress
recently passed a federal law requiring such measures for groups overseas, so it would be feasible
to take such measures domestically as well. A federal definition of crimes against humanity would
provide a robust and specific basis for preventative measures in all forms.
Relatedly, a domestic atrocity law could also serve a more general deterrence function, by
condemning the prohibited acts and by creating a threat of prosecution. 182 Any preventative
measures that are introduced will of course not be entirely effective in preventing all underlying
acts or problematic policies. The possibility of being prosecuted for crimes against humanity
provides an additional safeguard by deterring at least some actors, both within the government and
outside it.
A crimes against humanity law would also serve an expressive function. 183 First and foremost,
it condemns the acts themselves in the strongest possible terms. With its reference to actions
undertaken under the auspices of a state policy, it also signals the state’s intention to hold itself
and its own officials to account. It also provides an opportunity to denounce non-state actors who
have advocated crimes against humanity and to indicate the government’s determination to stand
against such organizations. 184
A crimes against humanity law adopting international standards would also expand the
existing federal legal framework to encompass additional harmful acts. Some underlying acts for
crimes against humanity do not have analogues in domestic law; for example, U.S. law does not
prohibit enforced disappearances. 185 Thus, in some instances, a crimes against humanity law would
criminalize acts not otherwise prohibited.
Of course, a federal crimes against humanity law would also provide a basis for prosecutions.
The capacity to engage in domestic prosecutions is a primary justification for such laws, and such
prosecutions would have the potential to bring justice and accountability for truly horrific acts. 186

181

Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181 (1996).
Burke-White, Community, supra note 177, at 79–80; MARK DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT, AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2007); Berlin & Dancy, supra note 177, at 542.
183
Margaret M. deGuzman, Choosing to Prosecute: Expressive Selection at the International Criminal Court, 33
MICH. J. INT’L L. 265, 312–18 (2012); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021
(1996).
184
Berlin, supra note 177, at 14.
185
See discussion, infra, Part IV.C.
186
Berlin & Dancy, supra note 177; Diane Marie Amann, Group Mentality, Expressivism, and Genocide, 2 INT’L
CRIM. L. REV. 93, 116 (2002); William Burke-White, Proactive Complementarity: The International Criminal Court
and National Courts in the Rome System of Justice, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 53 (2008).
182

36

Baylis - White Supremacy, Police Brutality, & Family Separation: Preventing CAH in the US
Forthcoming in 2022 U. Ill. L. Rev.
Draft of May 1, 2021

In this prosecutorial context, a crimes against humanity law would serve several purposes, above
and beyond what would already be offered by other domestic law.
The primary prosecutorial role of a crimes against humanity law and other atrocity laws is to
charge the defendants with acts that are commensurate with the gravity of their crimes, recognizing
their acts as particularly horrific, and attaching the stigma of an atrocity crime to their behavior.187
For example, a militia that planned and carried out an attack on a state capitol and killed a
substantial number of people could be charged with ordinary murder, but charges of crimes against
humanity would capture the severity of the entire attack, the extent of the atrocity, and the fact that
it is not only a crime but a human rights violation. Charging such a group with crimes against
humanity sends a different message even than other severe crimes like terrorism or insurrection,
highlighting the human cost and the perpetrators’ abandonment of all standards of decency, not
only the political motive. Thus, crimes against humanity invoke universal human values and sparks
moral outrage, in addition to signaling the extreme severity of the defendants’ crimes. 188
Of course, carrying out prosecutions also enhances the deterrent effect of a domestic crimes
against humanity law, by demonstrating the state’s willingness to carry out such prosecutions. 189
This may be particularly influential if it is current or former state officials who are prosecuted, as
such prosecutions indicate that no one is above the law. 190
crimes against humanity prosecutions also serve as a final safeguard against impunity, when
other crimes cannot be charged. Official immunity may preclude criminal charges or civil lawsuits
against government officials, but atrocity law typically does not recognize such immunities.191
Statutes of limitations may run for some domestic crimes, but there are generally no statutes of
limitations for crimes against humanity. 192
In addition, a crimes against humanity law would be a relatively durable legal protection. As
discussed further below in Part V, a federal law is of course far more difficult to change than
executive orders or discretionary agency actions undertaken for preventative purposes. As such, a
law is more likely to constrain future Presidential administrations than actions based purely in the
executive branch.
Finally, another justification for ratifying atrocity law treaties like the Genocide Convention
and the Geneva Convention and adopting implementing legislation is to enable states to participate
in international institutions and processes. 193 A federal law would enable both prosecutions of
foreign perpetrators in the United States, as advocated by proponents, and a stronger basis for
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engagement in international interventions to prevent atrocities overseas. 194 The UN Framework
suggests that engaging in such international frameworks provides some domestic protection
against escalation into crimes against humanity. This would be particularly relevant if a crimes
against humanity convention and associated treaty body or other monitoring mechanism is
developed. However, as discussed below in Part IV.B, the United States has traditionally been
reluctant to participate in international human rights frameworks.
Of course, a federal crimes against humanity law adopting international norms would not be
a panacea for the risks of crimes against humanity identified in Part III. But it would provide a
legal basis for prevention, deterrence, prosecution, and other measures aimed at mitigating that
risk. Part B explores why the United States nonetheless has not adopted a federal crimes against
humanity legal framework.
B. Dynamics
The United States has recognized the international jus cogens norm prohibiting crimes against
humanity in several ways. U.S. federal courts have regularly acknowledged and enforced the
prohibition on crimes against humanity under customary international law in the context of Alien
Tort Statute cases. 195 The United States has also made a political commitment to prevent crimes
against humanity and other atrocity crimes by voting for the U.N. General Assembly’s
unanimously approved “Responsibility to Protect” resolution in 2005, agreeing that: “Each
individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes,
including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility
and will act in accordance with it.” 196
However, unlike genocide and war crimes, the United States has not ratified an international
treaty setting forth the crimes against humanity prohibition. It has refused to join the ICC, whose
Rome Statute is the only existing international legal agreement encompassing crimes against
humanity. 197 As of this writing, the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles for the
Prevention and Prosecution of Crimes Against Humanity have not yet been acted upon by the U.N.
Sixth Committee, so the opportunity to consider ratifying a potential convention on crimes against
humanity has not yet arisen. The U.S. comments on the Draft Articles, discussed below, indicate
that it is unlikely to ratify such a Convention. 198 In both contexts, its predominant objection has
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been to provisions that might limit its exercise of sovereignty and to international or foreign
jurisdiction over its citizens. 199
Nor, as noted above, has the United States adopted a federal law concerning crimes against
humanity. There are two dynamics that are telling for understanding why this gap exists: the
exclusively international focus of all federal attention to crimes against humanity, and opposition
to ratifying similar treaties and passing implementing legislation.
1. International Orientation
Between the 93rd Congress which opened in 1973 and June 2020 of the 116th Congress, the
phrase “crimes against humanity” was mentioned in legislation and committee reports more than
1,000 times. But none of these instances concerned risks or incidents within the United States.200
Instead, many of these were recognitions of the victims of past atrocities, 201 while others concerned
legislation to address events occurring overseas. 202
The United States has also devoted considerable financial resources toward supporting
international criminal prosecutions in other countries. It was the largest donor to the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia;
it has also made substantial financial contributions to the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the
Extraordinary African Chambers, among others. 203
In addition, the United States has committed significant executive branch resources to crimes
against humanity and other atrocity crimes; all are aimed entirely at preventing and responding
effectively to mass atrocities in other countries. Zachary Kaufman has comprehensively analyzed
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the key aspects of the multifaceted executive branch strategy for international atrocity prevention,
so I will merely highlight a few characteristic examples here. 204
In 2011, President Obama issued a Presidential Directive declaring atrocity prevention to be
“a core national security interest and core moral responsibility” and establishing an interagency
Atrocities Prevention Board (“APB”), among other measures. 205 Both the Directive and the
reported work of the APB focus entirely on preventing and punishing atrocities overseas; they do
not appear to contemplate any risk of atrocities occurring within the United States, and all domestic
implementation has been aimed entirely at interdicting foreign perpetrators. 206
In addition, in 2019, Congress passed the Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act
(“Elie Wiesel Act”), which strengthens U.S. government capabilities to act against crimes against
humanity, war crimes, and genocide and requires various executive branch actions including
regular reports to Congress. 207 Many of its mandates are explicitly directed internationally; others
do not make a specific statement about their focus, but the international orientation of the law is
evident in context.208 According to the 2020 report to Congress under the Elie Wiesel Act, all
relevant executive action was externally oriented at atrocity prevention and accountability in other
countries. 209 Implementation within the United States was aimed entirely at “closing the impunity
gap,” meaning preventing foreign perpetrators of crimes against humanity, war crimes, or genocide
from immigrating and thereby finding “safe haven” within the United States, by prosecuting and
deporting them. 210
Further emphasizing this international orientation, two agencies that should be directly
concerned with preventing atrocities within the United States by virtue of their missions and
authority are DHS and DOJ. However, neither agency seems to have any programs directed at this
aim. Both DHS’s 2013 report on its APB-related atrocity prevention activities and the 2020 Report
pursuant to the Elie Wiesel Act described its only domestic activities as immigration enforcement
204
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against foreign human rights violators and war criminals. 211 DOJ’s 2014 annual performance
report and contributions to the 2020 Elie Wiesel report both characterized its activities as being
aimed entirely at events that occurred abroad. 212 The 2013 DOJ report specifically observes as a
factor enhancing the difficulty of DOJ’s work that “[m]ass atrocities occur overseas in chaotic
settings,” 213 foreclosing any contemplation of the possibility of atrocities occurring within the
United States.
Of course, DHS and DOJ are also closely associated with the risks of crimes against humanity
discussed in Part II by dint of their extensive authority to detain and use force against civilians.
But since there is no federal law prohibiting crimes against humanity, it should come as no surprise
that there is also no domestic implementation of that prohibition aimed at oversight or
accountability for DOJ or DHS officers. For example, there is no reference to crimes against
humanity in ICE’s publicly available employee codes of conduct or detention center standards. 214
However, there are of course laws and policies prohibiting many of the underlying acts constituting
crimes against humanity,
Thus, the U.S. approach to preventing and punishing crimes against humanity has been
directed entirely at atrocities committed overseas. There is no federal law prohibiting crimes
against humanity, and there are no internal prevention or prosecution mechanisms aimed
specifically at crimes against humanity within the federal government. This American
exceptionalism 215 is amplified in its approach to other atrocity laws, as discussed in the next
section.
2. American Exceptionalism
The United States does have federal laws criminalizing other international atrocity crimes. It
has ratified the Genocide Convention and the Geneva Conventions and has adopted federal laws
prohibiting genocide and war crimes. 216 It has also taken federal action against other related
211
Department of Homeland Security, DHS Directives System, Directive Number: 212-01, Revision Number: 01,
Atrocities and Human Rights (Nov. 6, 2013), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/mgmt/defense-andnational-security/mgmt-dir_212-01-attrocities-and-human-rights_revision-01.pdf; EWGAPA Report, supra note 209.
212
Department of Justice, FY 2014 Annual Performance Report & FY 2016 Annual Performance Plan, at II-62,
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/doj/pages/attachments/2015/02/05/fy14_16_sec2.pdf
(“DOJ
2014
Report”). EWGAPA Report, supra note 209, Parts IV, V & VII.
213
Id.
214
2019 National Detention Standards for Non-Dedicated Facilities, https://www.ice.gov/detention-standards/2019;
U.S.
Immigration
and
Customs
Enforcement,
Employee
Code
of
Conduct
(2012),
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/dro_policy_memos/employee-code-of-conduct.pdf.
215
There is an extensive literature on American exceptionalism in the human rights and atrocity law contexts. E.g.,
Leila Nadya Sadat, The Nuremberg Paradox, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 151 (2010); AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND
HUMAN RIGHTS (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005); Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV.
1479, 1481 n.4 (2003) (“Exceptionalism”).
216
Genocide Convention, supra note 4; Genocide, 18 U.S.C. § 1091; United Nations Treaty Convention, Depositary,
Status of Treaties, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-1&chapter=4&clang=_en;
Geneva
Conventions, supra note 4; War Crimes Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2441; International Committee of the Red Cross,

41

Baylis - White Supremacy, Police Brutality, & Family Separation: Preventing CAH in the US
Forthcoming in 2022 U. Ill. L. Rev.
Draft of May 1, 2021

international crimes; for example, it has ratified the Torture Convention and passed the U.S.
Torture Act and other federal legislation relating to torture. 217
However, these ratifications and the implementing legislation have been hard won in
Congress. The United States has consistently been very slow to ratify human rights treaties and
atrocity law treaties. There has been strong opposition to such ratifications in the Senate, based
primarily on the threat that adopting and implementing such international law might pose to U.S.
nationals, who might then be prosecuted overseas, and to the structure of existing U.S. law,
particularly constitutional protections and federalism. The result has been lengthy battles over
ratification and the failure to ratify some nearly universally accepted treaties, such as the
Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women and the Convention on the
Rights of the Child. 218
Furthermore, when the United States has ratified a human rights treaty, it has done so with
reservations, understandings, and declarations (“RUDs”) and implementing legislation that
sharply narrow the key definitions and limit its obligations under the treaty. 219 This particular
pattern of American exceptionalism, wherein the United States “actually exempts itself from
certain international law rules and agreements, even ones that it may have played a critical role in
framing,” 220 along with the nature of the opposition to these related treaties and laws, provides
some insight into the international focus of anti-atrocity efforts described above, as well as the
course of the 2009 legislation discussed below.
The process of ratifying and implementing the Genocide Convention is an informative
example, as the prohibition on genocide is closely related to the prohibition on crimes against
humanity. It took the United States 40 years to ratify the Genocide Convention, which was signed
by President Truman in 1948 and ratified by the Senate under President Reagan in 1988. 221 The
concerns expressed in the Senate during the many years of non-ratification would also be relevant
to any proposed crimes against humanity legislation: that ratifying the Genocide Convention might
interfere with constitutional rights or federalism, that the United States would be disadvantaged
internationally because it would take its legal obligations under the treaty more seriously than
would other states, 222 and that the United States might be obligated to extradite its nationals for
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prosecution in foreign courts. 223 Debate also raised the familiar argument that genocide is a
problem of other states:
It was frequently stated in the Senate that ratification by the United States of the Genocide
Convention would constitute a goodwill gesture designed to show support for an
international cause because United States citizens are protected by the U.S. Constitution
and, in any event, the crime of genocide would be unthinkable in the United States. 224
The implementing legislation narrowed the definition of genocide in several ways that do not
directly address the above-expressed concerns, including by heightening the intent requirement,
the proportion of the victim group that must be threatened with destruction, and the type of mental
harm that must be inflicted to be considered a genocidal act. 225 In ratifying, the Senate attached
RUDs intended to limit the U.S. obligations to those defined in the implementing legislation, rather
than the broader treaty terms. 226 Thus, the U.S. federal genocide law departs in significant ways
from the international treaty and from the associated jus cogens norm; all of these divergences
served to heighten the domestic requirements for genocide and thereby limit U.S. obligations. 227
The implementing legislation for the Geneva Conventions and the Torture Convention
similarly operate to limit U.S. obligations. The War Crimes Act, as amended, only prohibits certain
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. 228 The U.S. ratified the Torture Convention with
extensive RUDs, limiting its definition of the scope of the definition of torture and of its obligations
under the treaty. 229 In particular, as it would do with the 2009 CAH legislation, in implementing
the Torture Convention, Congress relied as much as possible on restating existing federal laws,
rather than introducing new provisions criminalizing torture as such, thus restricting its obligations
under the Convention to those already existing under federal law insofar as possible. 230 Among
other changes to the international provisions, as discussed in Part III above, the U.S. definition of
torture in its implementing law significantly limits its recognition of mental harm. 231 The following
observation by Stefan Riesenfeld and Frederick Abbott about the Torture Convention ratification
223
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is also pertinent to the Senate’s approach to the Genocide Convention and to the crimes against
humanity legislation discussed below:
The U.S. understandings to the Torture Convention reflect a caution which is difficult to
reconcile with America’s self-perception as a leading proponent of human rights. We will
not dissect each of the interpretative constraints, but merely note that most are designed
to raise the threshold of malicious behavior necessary to constitute a violation of the terms
of the treaty. 232
States often ratify human rights treaties with no intention of complying with them, and so on
the one hand, this U.S. practice reflects a serious approach to the legal implications of ratification
and implementation. 233 Whereas other states may make the calculation that ratifying such a treaty
is a cost-free endeavor because their obligations under the treaty are unlikely ever to be enforced,
the United States may reasonably foresee enforcement in its own, highly active, judicial system; it
also regularly raises concerns about unfounded, politically motivated enforcement in foreign and
international courts. By limiting its obligations under a treaty to only those rules it has already
enacted in federal law, it ensures that it can comply. 234
However, this reluctance also signals an unwillingness to engage with the aspirational and
protective aspects of such treaties. Most fundamentally, such treaties do unapologetically set
standards that can be difficult to meet and invite states to ratify in a spirit of progressive movement
toward compliance. Such treaties and laws also represent an opportunity for the government to
place safeguards against itself, so as to constrain future Presidential administrations and
government actors from committing atrocities.
Overall, in U.S. ratification of human rights and atrocity treaties and its consideration of
implementing legislation, there is consistently strong opposition from legislators who see these
conventions and laws as a threat to US sovereignty, federalism, and constitutional norms. The
ratification and implementation processes are directed, not at fully adopting and fulfilling the treaty
terms so as to maximize their protections, but rather at narrowing the established legal standards
and minimizing U.S. obligations. Accordingly, the international focus of initiatives concerning
crimes against humanity is entirely consistent with U.S. exceptionalism concerning other atrocity
and human rights treaties, and with the structure and fate of the proposed 2009 legislation on
crimes against humanity, discussed in the next section.
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C. 2009 Legislation
The absence of a federal law on crimes against humanity is a well-known and long criticized
deficiency in federal atrocity law. David Scheffer and Beth van Schaack, among other scholars,
have observed the absence of a prohibition on crimes against humanity within the domestic legal
framework and have advocated for such a law before Congress and within the executive branch. 235
The closest that Congress has come to enacting such a law was in 2009, when an effort by the
Obama Administration in coordination with Senator Dick Durbin’s office culminated in proposed
legislation that would have established crimes against humanity as a federal crime. 236 The Crimes
Against Humanity Act of 2009 (“2009 CAH legislation”) was introduced on June 24, 2009. If
passed, the original bill would have criminalized: “commit[ing] or engag[ing] in” specified federal
crimes, including murder, kidnapping, torture, and others, “as part of a widespread and systematic
attack directed against any civilian population, and with knowledge of the attack.” 237 The
jurisdictional provisions authorized jurisdiction based on the perpetrator’s nationality, residence,
or presence in the United States, or on the commission of the offence in whole or in part within
the United States. 238 The legislation was referred to the Judiciary Committee and reported out of
committee in an amended version, but did not proceed beyond that point. 239
In light of the difficult struggle to ratify the treaties and pass the implementing legislation
discussed above, Senator Durbin’s office must have been well aware that a crimes against
humanity bill would meet significant opposition. The text of the legislation seems to have been
crafted to optimize its chances of passing. The way that the bill was characterized by its supporters
was also carefully chosen to provide lawmakers with reasons to support the bill and to defuse any
perception that it posed a threat to U.S. interests. The sections below review the history of this
legislation, including the advocacy strategy.
1. International Orientation
While the 2009 CAH legislation would by its terms have applied to crimes against humanity
committed within the United States, the context in which that legislation was developed and the
arguments made in its favor all affirm the predominantly external orientation of U.S. law and
policy on atrocities. Supporters’ characterization of the purposes of this bill exclusively concerned
preventing foreign war criminals who had committed crimes against humanity from “finding safe
haven” in the United States. 240 According to proponents, a federal law on crimes against humanity
235
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equivalent to those on war crimes and genocide would enable the United States to prosecute
equally heinous crimes that happened to occur in a non-conflict context without a genocidal
purpose. 241 The co-sponsors of the bill pointed to DHS data indicating that at least 1,000 such
foreign human rights abusers were in the United States and indicated that the proposed legislation
would “close the loophole” and enable such prosecutions by prohibiting crimes against
humanity. 242 They couched the bill in terms of the need to uphold the U.S. role as a world leader
in opposing and prosecuting such atrocities. 243 The absence of such a law was harming the
country’s international standing and reputation and limits its redress against perpetrators who
attempt to immigrate to the United States. 244
One significant implication of this international orientation concerns the prospects for
domestic implementation. As discussed below in Part V, a federal crimes against humanity law
would be of minimal effectiveness in preventing crimes against humanity unless it was
successfully implemented. The 2009 CAH legislation did not provide any explicit direction
concerning its implementation. However, the exclusively international focus of the advocacy for
the bill, together with the long history of treating crimes against humanity and other atrocity crimes
as foreign issues, suggests that its implementation and enforcement would have been focused
solely on immigration and international contexts, just like the implementation of the 2011
Directive and the 2019 Elie Wiesel Act. 245
2. Changes to International Standards
The reader will recall from Part II that in international law, crimes against humanity comprise
several chapeau elements and an underlying act or acts. The 2009 CAH legislation maintains this
basic structure and adopts some of its language directly from international law. However, there are
several key differences between the international standards for crimes against humanity discussed
above in Part II and the 2009 CAH legislation. These changes would have diminished its scope,
and in particular, its effectiveness in protecting civilians from the government itself.
First, the underlying acts were limited in several ways. As discussed in Part II, the Draft
Articles list ten underlying acts and a catch-all of “other inhumane acts of a similar character.” 246
In the 2009 CAH legislation, in an apparent effort to hew as closely as possible to existing federal
law, the underlying acts are defined predominantly according to crimes already in the U.S. code,
legislation-making-crimes-against-humanity-a-violation-of-us-law; Senator Richard Durbin, “Durbin: Human Rights
Violators Still Finding Safe Haven in America” (Oct. 6, 2009), https://www.durbin.senate.gov/newsroom/pressreleases/durbin-human-rights-violators-still-finding-safe-haven-in-america.
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including among others murder, sexual abuse, and torture. 247 Of particular significance to the
representative examples above, by relying on federal law to define the underlying acts insofar as
possible, the definition of torture was limited to the narrower definition under U.S. law rather than
encompassing the broader international law definition. 248 Particularly significant to the
representative examples above is that neither illegal deportation nor enforced disappearances were
included in the list of prohibited acts. 249 The legislation does include three underlying acts that
were not already criminalized under federal law and that might be relevant to prosecutions of
White supremacist groups: “extermination,” “national, ethnic, racial or religious cleansing” and
“imposed measures meant to prevent births.” 250 Overall, while this legislation did not go as far as
past atrocity legislation by eliminating all differences with federal law, it hewed predominantly to
federal law and diverged significantly from the international definition. Due to these changes, for
example, family separation would be considerably less likely to fall within the ambit of the 2009
CAH legislation’s definition than the international law definition.
The 2009 CAH legislation also made several changes to the international chapeau elements
that all made it more difficult to meet these requirements. As discussed in Part II, the Draft Articles
require that the specified underlying acts be part of a “widespread or systematic attack against any
civilian population, with knowledge of the attack,” and further defines an attack as “a course of
conduct involving the multiple commission of [the listed underlying] acts . . . against any civilian
population pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such an
attack.” 251 The international “widespread or systematic” language was changed to a requirement
for a “widespread and systematic attack,” heightening this standard. 252 Further, whereas under
international law there is no threshold number of victims for an attack to be “widespread,” and
both numerical and geographical factors are relevant, in the Judiciary Committee, the draft
legislation was amended to set a minimum of 50 affected persons. 253 And whereas in international
jurisprudence, “systematic” refers to the organized and non-random nature of an attack, the 2009
CAH legislation imports the policy requirement into this definition and then increases that policy
requirement. It does so by adopting the ICC Elements of Crimes’ requirement that a state or
247
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organization must have “actively promoted” the policy, but omitting its corresponding recognition
that under certain circumstances willful blindness can constitute a policy. 254 Nor does the Senate
definition recognize de facto policies or policies demonstrated via circumstantial evidence, as
acknowledged by ICC jurisprudence. 255 This would make it considerably more difficult to use
crimes against humanity to protect against risks emanating from de facto policies or willful
blindness.
In addition to these definitional changes, there were two other changes that are significant
because they dramatically diminish the extent to which this law could have been effective in
constraining the state itself from acting against civilian populations under its control. First, in the
amended bill, the usual international rules on defenses and immunities were abrogated. This
amendment affirming that “[n]othing in this section shall be construed to limit or extinguish any
defense or immunity otherwise available to any person or entity” is contradictory to the aim of
crimes against humanity to be applicable to all regardless of official position, superior orders, or
other immunities. 256 Concerning the representative situations listed above, this would enable
government agents to continue to assert qualified immunity or other official immunities for their
actions in the crimes against humanity context as well as under other domestic law.
Furthermore, an additional procedural mechanism was introduced to enable the executive
branch to intervene to prevent prosecutions. Specifically, the Attorney General had to certify the
prosecution in writing, and the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and Director of National
Intelligence must also be consulted and not object. 257 This would enable the federal government
to exempt anyone from prosecution and thereby undermine the efficacy of the law against
government officials.
These changes seem to have been introduced to make the bill more palatable to lawmakers by
minimizing additional domestic legal obligations beyond those already existing in U.S. law. Many
of these changes were made in committee after the introduction of the original bill, further
indicating that they were added in response to concerns expressed by opponents in an effort to
reach a compromise and build sufficient support for the bill.258 These are, of course, the same
strategies that were at work in the federal laws implementing the Genocide Convention, Geneva
Conventions and Torture Convention above.
There is some apparent tension between the notion urged by supporters that the law is intended
to enable the United States to prosecute foreign perpetrators and the steps taken in the initial
254
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257
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drafting and in the Judiciary Committee to narrow the legislation vis-a-vis international law. To
put it plainly, why would the United States want to make it more difficult to find a person guilty
of crimes against humanity under national law, if the intended function of the law is entirely to
protect the United States from foreign perpetrators entering the United States and to enable the
United States to prosecute such perpetrators? These two trends—toward characterizing the law as
international in focus and toward narrowing it—can be harmonized by treating them both as an
accommodation of American exceptionalism; opponents were likely far less concerned with
maximizing DOJ’s ability to prosecute foreign perpetrators than with ensuring that U.S. actions
could not be scrutinized.
3. Implications
Overall, the 2009 CAH legislation would have prohibited a set of harms like murder and
torture as already criminalized under federal law, as well as the additional underlying acts of
extermination, measures to prevent births in a group, and ethnic, racial and religious cleansing,
when committed in furtherance of an actively advocated policy, in connection with an attack
harming at least 50 people. Such acts could have been prosecuted only with the consent of several
Cabinet-level officials and would have been subject to all ordinary domestic defenses and
immunities. Thus, not only would the 2009 legislation, if passed, have faced the same kinds of
obstacles and limits as existing constitutional and criminal law, it would also have been subject to
the additional constraint of political approval for any prosecutions.
The proposed federal law would nevertheless have been useful for certain purposes. It would
have provided a basis for prosecuting non-government actors (who are not subject to immunities
and whom Cabinet officials would be unlikely to exempt from prosecution), thereby enabling
government action against White supremacist and extremist groups or other non-state
organizations. It would have criminalized several new underlying acts that might be particularly
relevant to White supremacist organizations because of those acts’ connection to discriminatory
motivations.
The proposed federal law would also have operated effectively for the purpose that its
proponents advocated: subject to the above-mentioned limits of its definitions, it would have
enabled prosecution of foreign perpetrators attempting to immigrate to the United States. While
this Article is concerned with domestic prevention of crimes against humanity, as noted above,
enforcement against foreign perpetrators is also both appropriate and important.
However, the 2009 CAH legislation’s changes to international law would have substantially
undermined its ability to constrain the government itself. First, the legislation does not include two
of the underlying acts that relate specifically to government action and that appeared potentially
relevant in examining the representative situations in Part III: enforced disappearances and illegal
deportation. More importantly, the requirement that the government not only have a policy but that
this policy must be expressly advocated, without exception, means that only the most overt of
government policies would have been covered by the new law. The family separation policy might
have been eligible, but situations of willful blindness or de facto policies could not qualify,
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excluding any possibility of addressing instances of widespread and persistent abuses deliberately
overlooked and quietly supported by those in authority. This is particularly troubling, because it is
such situations, like sexual assaults in immigration detention and police brutality against Black
Americans, that have been more difficult to address under domestic law. 259 Thus, rather than
mitigating this weak spot in existing domestic law, the 2009 CAH legislation would have
replicated it. In addition, permitting all defenses and immunities to apply and requiring consent at
the highest level of government for each individual case would have eliminated any likelihood of
prosecuting current or even former government officials. Once again, this replicates an existing
weakness in domestic law: official immunities have been a significant obstacle to prosecutions and
civil suits against government actors. 260 Indeed, one of the most significant roles of atrocity law is
typically to eliminate such barriers: a comparative study of atrocity trials in post-transition states
found that the most important way in which domestic atrocity laws enabled such trials was to lower
the legal barriers to prosecutions, such as statutes of limitations, immunities and amnesties, that
would have prevented trials for ordinary crimes. 261
Furthermore, all of these limitations would have impacted prevention and deterrence as well
as prosecutions. As in the prosecutorial context, it is prevention and deterrence mechanisms aimed
at the state that would have been most severely affected. In addition to the constraints imposed by
the other definitional limits, any preventative processes within the federal bureaucracy would have
been limited to consideration only of express policies. Any deterrent effect would have been
significantly curtailed by the implausibility of eventual enforcement against government officials.
Finally, there is a Catch-22 at the heart of any attempt to pass federal crimes against humanity
legislation in the United States. A core purpose of crimes against humanity is to protect people
from the power of the government, by offering protections that are more sweeping and more
durable than those available under domestic law. But the only realistic possibility of passing
federal crimes against humanity legislation in the United States is to eliminate from its provisions
any additional protections offered by international law. Thus, the only way of gaining the desired
protection in principle is to excise any component that would make it protective in fact.
Furthermore, there is a risk associated with passing such legislation: that it might be not only
toothless, but counterproductive. Specifically, the 2009 CAH legislation could have been used to
legitimize government action that was prohibited only under international, but not federal, law.
For example, a narrow federal law could have been used to argue that the United States was bound
by its own domestic definitions rather than international law, and so policies of willful blindness
to widespread abuses, or commission of forms of torture that are recognized only under
international law, do not constitute crimes against humanity. 262
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Overall, the best scenario for using a crimes against humanity law to complement and
synergize with existing federal law is to pass a law that comports with international norms.
Although narrowing international law has significant drawbacks, even a law like the 2009 CAH
legislation would provide a legal basis for at least some preventative measures and prosecutions,
especially against non-state actors like militias and White supremacist organizations. However, it
has proved to be extraordinarily difficult to pass atrocity laws in the past, and the fate of the 2009
CAH legislation suggests that even an extremely restricted version of a crimes against humanity
law will face intense opposition, particularly since political division and partisanship have only
increased since then. Given these complications, Part V explores implementation and mitigation
strategies that could be pursued either with or without a federal crimes against humanity law.
V. IMPLEMENTATION AND MITIGATION
As set out in Part III, the risks of crimes against humanity in the United States are long-term
and structural, not only immediate and contextual. As discussed in Part IV, a federal law would
provide a legal basis for implementing comprehensive institutional safeguards against crimes
against humanity within the United States, but such a law would be difficult to pass and would
likely be limited in its scope to provisions that mirror existing federal law. Thus, this Part considers
several possible protective mechanisms that might be both feasible and durable, capable of
mitigating the risk of crimes against humanity not only immediately, but through all kinds of future
Congresses and Presidential administrations. Part V.A assesses the military’s war crimes model,
which would best be effectuated under a federal crimes against humanity law. Part V.B considers
countermeasures that the executive branch could carry out on its own, without additional
legislation.
A. War Crimes Model
The U.S. legal framework for addressing war crimes recognizes the risks associated with
authorizing use of force and detention powers; it accordingly criminalizes war crimes under federal
law and deploys a robust set of internal institutional mechanisms designed to prevent war crimes
from occurring. As such, it represents a model for how a prohibition on crimes against humanity
might be implemented in civilian federal agencies.
In contrast to the lack of a federal law prohibiting crimes against humanity, it is a federal
crime punishable by fine, imprisonment, or death for a U.S. national or member of the U.S. military
to commit a war crime. 263 Concerning the above discussion about the likely limits of the scope of
any potential federal crimes against humanity law, it is significant that the War Crimes Act is

to jus cogens norms under international law, even without domestic implementation. This would maintain the integrity
of the norm, but there would be very limited avenues for enforcement within the United States. In particular, this
would not enable domestic prosecutions, and the limited enforceability would likely undermine any true preventative
or deterrent effect.
263
18 U.S.C. § 2441.

51

Baylis - White Supremacy, Police Brutality, & Family Separation: Preventing CAH in the US
Forthcoming in 2022 U. Ill. L. Rev.
Draft of May 1, 2021
narrower in scope than the Geneva Conventions; 264 nonetheless, it has been useful in providing a
legal basis for a protective framework.
The prohibition on war crimes is implemented through preventative measures at every level
of military action, including planning processes, commanders directing troops, and individual
service members’ implementation of commanders’ orders. The Department of Defense (“DOD”)
Law of War Manual is a document of more than 1200 pages that details how to address a wide
range of situations in accordance with the law of war, including treatment of civilians and detention
conditions. 265 The Manual has obligations for both service members and commanders. It requires
that all service members be “trained in the law of war commensurate with their duties.”266
Individual service members are required to act in accordance with their training on the law of war,
and to interpret orders in such a way as to follow the law of war rather than as implicitly authorizing
violations. 267 Further, service members are affirmatively obligated to refuse to carry out orders
that would clearly violate the law of war. 268 For their part, commanders have an obligation to
implement the laws of war, to oversee those under their command, and to investigate and respond
to any violations. 269
In addition, the Manual requires comprehensive, regular legal consultations concerning all
military actions to ensure compliance with the laws of war. DOD legal advisors are required to be
present to advise commanders “at all levels of command” in every DOD component and to review
“all plans, policies, directives, and rules of engagement, and those of subordinate commands and
components” for law of war compliance. 270 As a consequence, the military has JAG lawyers
deployed throughout its field operations to advise on all operations, and “the extent to which law
is now embedded in military command decisions is difficult to overstate.” 271
Thus, it is not merely having legal strictures prohibiting war crimes in place that is important,
although of course that is essential. Rather, it is these components of “organizational structure and
institutional culture” 272—and specifically, integrated internal mechanisms staffed by influential
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“compliance agents” 273—that promote proactive observance of those legal norms. 274 The history
of the development of these preventative measures further validates this point. While the United
States has long had international legal obligations concerning war crimes, it has not always had a
robust set of protocols for implementing those obligations. Rather, after atrocities committed in
Vietnam became the subject of a scathing internal investigation, the DOD dramatically increased
its implementation strategies:
In response, the U.S. military strengthened its internal codes of conduct, updating the
U.S. Army Field Manual so that, in addition to specifying prohibited acts, it emphasized
that the main objective of war-time detention operations is “implementation of the
Geneva Conventions.’’ At the same time, the Department of Defense dramatically
stepped up training activities and gave military lawyers a greater role by initiating a “law
of war program,’’ run primarily by the JAG Corps, that was designed to educate troops
from all services in the law of war. The JAG Corps also gained new responsibilities on
the battleﬁeld: judge advocates were placed in the ﬁeld to develop and review operations
plans to ensure compliance with the law of war. Each commander thus had the beneﬁt of
a lawyer’s advice in the ﬁeld, and military lawyers became involved in operational
decision making as never before. Such actions helped institutionalize the authority and
role of these lawyers in the military bureaucracy. 275
Of course, these systems are imperfect; there have been numerous reports of alleged war
crimes by U.S. military forces that have gone unprevented, unpunished, or both. 276 Most recently,
allegations of U.S. war crimes in Afghanistan have led to a standoff with the ICC. 277 However,
this model need not be perfect to be useful; the question is not whether these preventative measures
have eliminated war crimes, but whether they have significantly reduced and mitigated such
incidents, and in this, the war crimes model seems to have succeeded. 278
Thus, overall, the military’s method for preventing war crimes is a particularly important
model for several reasons. First, it combines legal rules with a robust, systematic, and proactive
implementation system. Second, it is a model that is already in place within the U.S. within a wellrespected branch of the government, imbuing it with legitimacy. Third, it is an obviously feasible
model. If DOD can at least to some extent restrain its considerable authority to use force, surely
civilian agencies can too. Just as DOD was able to changed longstanding problematic practices, so
can other federal agencies. Finally, this system depends for its effectiveness on lawyers being
legalistic and on complex bureaucratic processes being bureaucratic, conditions that are likely to
273
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hold within civilian agencies as well. In the crimes against humanity context, a federal crimes
against humanity law would likely be needed to provide the legal framework to implement such a
robust, comprehensive system, although it is conceivable that this model could be used to directly
implement the U.S.’s obligations under customary international law. 279
B. Non-Legislative Strategies
Passing an effective federal law that comports with international standards and implementing
a comprehensive internal prevention framework like that in the military would be transformative
steps for preventing crimes against humanity within the United States. Because of the durability
of a federal law in comparison to solely executive action and because the implementation of the
military model would permeate civilian agencies with advance oversight processes, they would be
particularly effective in safeguarding against an administration that seeks to leverage its power
over ordinary domestic law and policy.
But passing a federal law and implementing a comprehensive strategy within federal agencies
is a challenging undertaking, as discussed above, and safeguarding against crimes against
humanity is not an all or nothing enterprise. Rather, there is benefit to be gained from incremental
protective measures as well as comprehensive programs. Further, there are other non-legislative
strategies that could be implemented by the executive branch without requiring a new federal law;
while less comprehensive, they would nonetheless be cognizable improvements.
Since, as discussed in Part III, risk is to some extent a formula of balancing the de facto power
or legal authority to use force and control with countervailing oversight, I address these measures
in two corresponding groups: mechanisms to limit authority and mechanisms to increase oversight.
1. Authority
In the representative examples discussed in Part III, authority to use force, detain, and
otherwise exercise power over civilians took several forms, including specific legal authority to
take particular actions as in the family separation context, general delegations of authority that
provide the opportunity to exert power and use force as in the police brutality and sexual assault
contexts, and legitimation of de facto power through statements implying approval, as in the White
supremacy context. To reduce the risks of crimes against humanity, each of these forms of
authority could be curtailed to some extent.
Of course, the federal government should refrain from specifically authorizing policies like
family separation. While it may not be possible in the absence of a federal law to implement
comprehensive review processes concerning crimes against humanity like those that the military
uses to prevent war crimes, it ought to be possible for DHS and other agencies to effectively review
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their policies in advance for unconstitutionality, or for conflicts with other protective federal
law. 280
Concerning the general authority of federal agents, DHS and DOJ have considerable
discretion over whether and how they deploy their officers and the direction that they give those
officers. As discussed above, the authority to use force carries with it an unavoidable risk of abuse.
To reduce the risk of crimes against humanity, DHS and other agencies could reduce the number
of agents they deploy, the situations in which they deploy them, and the scope of their authority to
use force, to detain, and to exercise control over detained persons, to the extent feasible given their
mandates. 281 At a minimum, consideration and mitigation of the risk of abuses up to and including
crimes against humanity could be an integral part of the process of approving such deployments.
However, such measures are of course subject to reversal from one Presidential administration to
another. Thus, they are not likely to be protective against a Presidential administration or
administrative agency that is attempting to subvert governmental power to abusive ends, nor
against one that is willing to turn a blind eye to abuses if increased deployment of federal agents
enables it to achieve other policy objectives.
Militias, White supremacist groups, and other such organizations outside the government have
no legal authority to use force. However, Presidential statements, use of prosecutorial discretion
to determine how vigorously to investigate and prosecute such groups, and other government
actions and statements may indicate approval or disapproval of their ideologies and violent plans
and may leave them with a greater or lesser sphere of power to carry out those plans. As discussed
above, statements by former President Trump indicated approval of the aims and actions of White
supremacist groups and those who stormed the U.S. Capitol, and those groups celebrated his
statements and took them as legitimation and implicit authorization. 282 In contrast, President Biden
denounced such groups in his first act as President, his inaugural address. 283 In addition, the Acting
U.S. Attorney for D.C. has indicated that his office is energetically investigating and bringing
charges against those involved in the U.S. Capitol insurrection, 284while the FBI has indicated that
it has “elevated to the top-level priority racially motivated violent extremism so it’s on the same
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footing in terms of our national threat banding as ISIS and homegrown violent extremism.”285
These measures further signal the federal government’s stance and shatter any illusion of
legitimization or impunity for such groups. Since Presidential statements and agency action are
not durable from administration to administration, it would be constructive for future Presidents
to make such statements a priority in the early days of their administrations, and for DOJ to
maintain a robust and well-publicized policy of prioritizing prosecution of members of such
organizations when their actions violate federal law.
2. Oversight
The other side of the balance is increasing oversight mechanisms. Here, the executive has
some options that are entirely within its control and would not require federal legislation. First, it
could leverage existing mechanisms already authorized by Congress that are intended to protect
against atrocities overseas, and direct them toward the risk of domestic crimes against humanity
as well. For example, the Elie Wiesel Act mandates “strengthening the diplomatic, risk analysis
and monitoring, strategic planning, early warning, and response capacities of the Government.” 286
While these measures are currently being implemented solely toward foreign risks, of the listed
areas of activity, only the diplomatic capacity of the United States is exclusively limited to foreign
affairs; the others could apply equally well domestically as internationally. Thus, these monitoring
and preventative mechanisms could be implemented to assess the risks posed by non-governmental
actors like White supremacist groups and even by the federal and state governments. Similarly,
the inter-agency Atrocities Early Warning Task Force (as the APB has been renamed) could
address domestic developments as well as international ones. 287 Such authority could be
constructively used to assess all the representative situations discussed above, including the effects
of increased immigration enforcement action, patterns of engagement with Black Americans by
police, and other systemic developments.
As noted in Part II, the United States is subject to the existing jus cogens requirements of
international law, irrespective of whether it implements those requirements in domestic law. Thus,
the President and federal agencies like DOJ and DHS could also implement protective mechanisms
under the auspices of international law. In addition to not requiring a federal law, this would have
the additional advantage of aligning those protective measures to fully comport with existing
standards under customary international law, rather than diverging from them, as a federal law
would likely do. 288 The extent of such implementation would be limited to preventative measures
otherwise within the authority of the executive or the relevant agencies and could not extend to
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prosecutions, 289 and implementing the international norm directly would be more difficult than
implementing such measures under the auspices of a federal law. 290
Finally, as noted above, constitutional law and criminal law also prohibit the vast majority of
the underlying acts that constitute crimes against humanity. Thus, the risk of crimes against
humanity occurring could be dramatically reduced by enhancing the capacity of these domestic
provisions to prevent the underlying acts from occurring and thus from rising to the level of crimes
against humanity. Some such changes might require judicial or congressional action, for example,
eliminating or reforming the doctrine of qualified immunity. 291 Others would be feasible within
the concerned agencies, for example, developing more robust internal oversight within agencies
of these constitutional and criminal requirements.
VI.

CONCLUSION

As Part V suggests, there are many steps that could be taken to mitigate the risk of crimes
against humanity within the United States. But the first and most important step is to recognize
that risk. For too long, the federal government has behaved as if the risk of crimes against humanity
existed only overseas, in fragile, conflict-ridden, and authoritarian states. While the United States
has recognized, at least in principle, that atrocities were committed against Black Americans and
Native Americans, it has not acknowledged that atrocities based in racism continue into the
present. The insurrection at the U.S. Capitol and the rise of white supremacist militias, the
government policy of family separation at the southern border, widespread police brutality against
Black Americans, and commonplace sexual assaults against immigrants in detention—all of these
events signal that the risk of crimes against humanity occurring within the United States is real.
Within government institutions, there are insufficient protections against the development of
harmful policies, and there is a fundamental imbalance between authority and oversight. In U.S.
society, there is a rising tide of White supremacy and extremism that is accruing the capability to
commit acts of violence up to and including crimes against humanity. Whether the United States
addresses these risks within the auspices of existing domestic law or by enacting new legal and
institutional measures, it is imperative to act before that balance tips too far, and crimes against
humanity are no longer a risk but an undeniable reality.
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